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INTRODUCTION
Bias in privately funded scientific research has been much in
the news recently.' Research bias causes problems in various
contexts, from medical decisionmaking to regulatory evalua-
1. The most prominent example is in tobacco research. Tobacco industry docu-
ments indicate both that the industry's criteria for research projects discouraged
those that might have shown risks from smoking, see Diana Henriques, Tobacco
Lawyers' Role Is Questioned, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1998, at A18, and that the indus-
try suppressed the results of studies that did detect health risks, see Milo Geyelin,
R.J. Reynolds' 60s Data Removal Cited, WALL ST. J., Apr. 15, 1998, at B15; Milo
Geyelin, Tobacco Papers Show Lawyers' Control of Data, WALL ST. J., Apr. 22, 1998,
at A3 [hereinafter, Geyelin, Tobacco Papers]. Another example that recently received
much press coverage is the suppression by Boots Pharmaceuticals, for several years,
of the results of research it had funded that unexpectedly showed that a drug it
sold was no more effective than drugs of its competitors. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 118-24.
2. See, e.g., Thomas M. Burton, Urodollars: A Prostate Researcher Tested Firm's
Product-And Sat on Its Board, WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 1998, at Al; Laura Johannes,
Medical Editorialists May Have Failed To Disclose Ties to Obesity-Drug Firms, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 28, 1996, at B3. For further discussion of the incident discussed in the
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tions,3 but the problems it presents are particularly acute in liti-
gation. Scientific evidence is difficult for lay fact finders to as-
sess under the best of circumstances. Bias exacerbates this diffi-
culty because the same unfamiliarity with the practice of science
that makes it difficult for laypersons to assess scientific evidence
also makes it difficult for them to appreciate how bias can cor-
rupt that evidence. Therefore, even though bias in general is a
problem with which the adversary process is familiar, bias in
scientific research may require an approach tailored to the par-
ticular difficulties that arise in that context.
Of course, the problem of bias in scientific evidence has not
gone unnoticed by courts and commentators.4 But most efforts to
address the problem have focused on biased witnesses rather
than on biased researchers.5 These efforts, in other words, have
focused on bias introduced in the process of testifying and have
assumed that the underlying research record itself is unbiased.6
An important example, because of its influence, is the Ninth Cir-
cuit's opinion in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.7
In that opinion-to which this Article will refer as Daubert
I-the court asked "whether the experts are proposing to testify
about matters growing naturally and directly out of research
they have conducted independent of the litigation, or whether
they have developed their opinions expressly for purposes of tes-
tifying." The court then went on to treat research conducted
latter article, involving research into the effects of one-half of the weight control
drug combination known as "fen-phen," see infra text accompanying notes 45-51.
3. See Philip J. Hilts, F.D.A. Seeks Financial Disclosure by Researchers, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 24, 1994, at 7.
4. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir.
1995); KENNETH R. FOSTER & PETER W. HUBER, JUDGING SCIENCE: SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE
AND THE FEDERAL COURTS 207-24 (1997).
5. Although many experts are both witness and researcher, many other expert
witnesses testify regarding the work of researchers who are not themselves before
the court. See infra text accompanying notes 218-27.
6. See FOSTER & HUBER, supra note 4, at 209-17; infra text accompanying notes
28-36.
7. 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995). The Ninth Circuit considered this case on re-
mand from the United States Supreme Court's decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
8. Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1317.
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independent of litigation as reliable, ignoring the many other,
nonlitigation sources of research bias.9
The weakness in this approach is apparent when one consid-
ers that a court would admit, apparently without further scru-
tiny, testimony regarding research funded by parties to litiga-
tion, so long as the research was not conducted in connection
with the litigation. For example, in a suit challenging the safety
of a drug, it would admit-again, without further scruti-
ny-research on the safety of the drug that was funded by its
manufacturer, if the research predated the litigation. Yet the
scientist conducting that research would be no less aware of the
result desired by the manufacturer than would a scientist con-
ducting similar research in connection with the litigation. Hence,
Daubert ITs litigation-based test does not draw an appropriate
line for admissibility.
Daubert II is surely correct, though, in treating bias as part of
the more general problem of evidentiary reliability that was the
focus of the Supreme Court in its Daubert opinion.'" In Daubert,
the Court held that, when considering scientific evidence, "evi-
dentiary reliability will be based on scientific validity."" Bias
certainly is an element of reliability; therefore, although Daubert
did not discuss bias problems specifically, the opinion at least
suggested that the Court would have bias issues decided in court
as science decides them. Indeed, science has adopted procedures
for dealing with bias that are in some respects similar to other
scientific practices-such as peer review-to which the Court di-
rected judges to defer.'2
This Article argues, however, that a reading of Daubert that
requires a scientific approach to conflicts would be inappropri-
9. See id. (noting "that an expert testifies based on research he has conducted
independent of the litigation provides important, objective proof that the research
comports with the dictates of good science" (citing PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S RE-
VENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 206-09 (1991))). Under Daubert H, only if
the proffered testimony is not based on independent research must its proponent
support it with other indicia of reliability. See id. at 1317-18.
10. See id. at 1316-18 (discussing the problem of bias in the context of reliability
criteria set out in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-
95 (1993)).
11. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 n.9.
12. See id. at 593-94.
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ate. Bias is no more a valid part of scientific fact finding than it
is of legal fact finding. The approaches of scientists to managing
conflicts of interest therefore are not themselves scientific, but
are simply efforts to preserve the objectivity of science. There is
no particular reason to think that the same methods would be
appropriate for ensuring objectivity in litigation, which is a very
different discipline.
Moreover, even in litigation, different sorts of conflicts present
different problems. The focus of Daubert II was on conflicts in-
troduced by the litigation process. These conflicts may indeed be
serious ones, but it is not clear that they are difficult ones for
fact finders to appreciate. They are, after all, the same sorts of
conflicts that are presented by the testimony of interested fact
witnesses. The conflicts of scientists whose pre-litigation re-
search is the subject of testimony are very different. Those con-
flicts may be reflected in subtle research choices whose implica-
tions will be very difficult for legal fact finders to assess. Hence,
it may be that in making admissibility decisions courts should
be more careful regarding purely "scientific" conflicts than they
are regarding litigation-related ones.1"
Part I of this Article outlines the holding and rationale of
Daubert, noting that the reasoning of the Court in that case
generally applies to conflicts of interest as well as to the specific
aspects of scientific practice the Court discussed. Part II then
reviews current treatment of the conflicts of scientific expert
witnesses in the lower courts and shows that it is inconsistent in
several respects with scientific treatment of such conflicts. Part
III argues, as suggested above, that the courts are nevertheless
correct in developing their own approach to conflicts because
conflicts pose different dangers in legal fact finding than they do
in science. Finally, Part IV proposes an approach to conflicts of
interest in scientific expert testimony that not only takes into
account the different contexts of law and science, but also recog-
13. In his recent philosophical examination of scientific expert testimony, Professor
Scott Brewer draws a similar distinction between witnesses and testimony, though
not in the context of conflicts of interest. See Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testi-
mony and Intellectual Due Process, 107 YALE L.J. 1535, 1582-85 (1998).
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nizes the distinction between the conflicts of scientific expert
witnesses and those of scientific researchers.
I. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND THE DAUBERT FRAMEWORK
The starting point in considering the admissibility of scientific
evidence is Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,14 in
which the Supreme Court set out criteria for trial judges to use
in making admissibility decisions. 5 Although the Court did not
explicitly consider the issue of bias, 16 its rationale for directing
judges to apply scientific standards in making admissibility deci-
sions appears as applicable in the context of bias as in other
aspects of evidentiary reliability.
A. Daubert
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides that an expert may
testify to "scientific... knowledge" that "will assist the trier of
fact."17 In Daubert, the Supreme Court read these two quoted
phrases to impose two more or less independent criteria for ad-
missibility: reliability and "fit," or relevance." It is the former
14. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
15. See id.. at 592-95.
16. The questions presented in Daubert were:
1. Whether, in light of the Federal Rules of Evidence, federal courts
may apply the rule of Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir.
1923), and hold expert scientific testimony inadmissible unless it has at-
tained general acceptance in the relevant scientific field.
2. Whether the Frye rule (assuming its applicability) is properly con-
strued to make the admissibility of expert scientific testimony depend
upon prior publication in a peer-reviewed journal.
Brief for Petitioners, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (No.
92-102).
17. FED. R. EVID. 702. In its entirety, Rule 702 provides: "If scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence
or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise." Id. Daubert did not consider the additional requirement of Rule 702 that
the witness be "qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education," id., but that requirement will be considered below. See infra text accom-
panying notes 189-91.
18. The Court wrote that "the requirement that an expert's testimony pertain to
'scientific knowledge' establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability," and that the
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criterion that applies to the issues addressed in this Article; the
latter asks only whether the proffered scientific evidence "prop-
erly can be applied to the facts in issue."19
In articulating a reliability requirement, the Supreme Court
began from the reference in Rule 702 to "scientific knowledge":
"The adjective scientific implies a grounding in the methods and
procedures of science. Similarly, the word knowledge connotes
more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation."2 0 The
Court then provided a set of five factors that it held were rele-
vant to determining whether proffered testimony is both "scien-
tific" and sufficiently well supported to constitute "knowledge."21
The factors are: (1) whether the expert's "theory or technique"
can be, and has been, tested; (2) whether it has been subjected
to peer review and publication; (3) whether, if the expert's testi-
mony is the product of a "particular scientific technique," the
technique has an acceptable known or potential rate of error; (4)
whether, again if a particular technique is involved, the applica-
tion of that technique complies with any standards governing its
operation; and, finally, (5) whether the testimony is generally
accepted in the scientific community.22 Each of these fac-
tors-except perhaps the third: error rate-is a reference to sci-
entific theory or practice.
Notably absent from this list is any mention of the possible
biases or conflicts of interest of the expert. The Court made
clear, however, that its list of factors is not exhaustive.2 3 This
rule "further requires that the evidence or testimony 'assist the trier of fact to un-
derstand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,' a "condition [that] goes pri-
marily to relevance." Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590-91.
19. Id. at 593.
20. Id. at 590.
21. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-95. Some authors describe the case as setting
out only four factors, presumably because the Court discussed both error rates and
professional standards in the context of application of "particular scientific tech-
niques." See, e.g., Margaret A. Berger, Evidentiary Framework, in FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CENTER, REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 37, 71-72 (1994); Bert Black et al.,
The Law of Expert Testimony-A Post-Daubert Analysis, in EXPERT EVIDENCE: A PRAC-
TrriONER'S GUIDE TO LAW, SCIENCE, AND THE FJC MANUAL 9, 15 (Bert Black & Patrick
W. Lee eds., 1997). But see Daniel J. Capra, The Daubert Puzzle, 32 GA. L. REV.
699, 702 (1998) (referring to five factors).
22. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-95.
23. See id. at 593 ("Many factors will bear on the inquiry, and we do not presume
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caveat suggests that conflicts would be a legitimate factor to
consider, at least to the extent that they affect evidentiary reli-
ability. The manner in which courts would take conflicts into
account is unclear, though. The Court indicated that other ap-
proaches to the reliability issues it addressed could "have merit,"
but apparently only "[tlo the extent that they focus on the reli-
ability of evidence as ensured by the scientific validity of its un-
derlying principles."24 This statement seems to suggest that con-
flicts, like other issues of reliability, should be assessed based on
their scientific significance, but this is not the approach the low-
er federal courts have taken.
B. Conflicts of Interest and Evidentiary Reliability
Conflicts of interest-or, more generally, biases--can affect
evidentiary reliability. Courts generally handle biases of expert
witnesses in the same way they handle biases of fact witnesses,
by permitting cross-examination about the biases and allowing
the fact finder to assess the overall credibility of the witnesses.25
As suggested above, though, conflicts of interest may present
particular problems for scientists and for laypersons assessing
their testimony. Perhaps, therefore, courts should treat biases in
scientific expert testimony differently than biases in other expert
testimony.2" It is, of course, exactly that sort of distinct treat-
ment of scientific expert testimony that the Supreme Court
established in Daubert when it wrote that, in regard to such
testimony, "evidentiary reliability will be based on scientific va-
lidity.2
to set out a definitive checklist or test.").
24. Id. at 594 n.12.
25. The Federal Rules of Evidence do not explicitly provide for impeachment of
witnesses on the basis of interestedness, but the Supreme Court has held that such
impeachment is permissible. See United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 51 (1984) ("We
think the lesson to be drawn from all of this is that it is permissible to impeach a
witness by showing his bias under the Federal Rules of Evidence just as it was per-
missible to do so before their adoption."); see also 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN ET AL.,
WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 1 607[031 (1996) (discussing impeachment for bias). Im-
peachment is appropriate for experts as well as fact witnesses. See Ford v. Wain-
wright, 477 U.S. 399, 415 (1986); Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 WIS. L.
REv. 1113, 1168.
26. See supra text accompanying note 3.
27. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 n.9.
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Some lower courts, however, have taken a different, and per-
haps inconsistent, approach."8 These courts have considered is-
sues of bias in the admissibility decision, as the unique
characteristics of scientific evidence suggest might be appropri-
ate. But instead of focusing on the broad range of conflicts that
affect scientific validity and then considering those conflicts in
the admissibility decision, the courts have looked at conflicts
from what-appears to be a narrower legal perspective and have
then held that those (legal) conflicts make the expert's testimony
unscientific.29 The most prominent example of this approach-
both in its explicitness and in the extent to which it has been
followed by other courts-is the Ninth Circuit's opinion on re-
mand in Daubert II. Delivering the opinion for a three-judge
panel, Judge Kozinski wrote that "the most persuasive basis" for
concluding that the expert proposes to testify to "scientific
knowledge" is that the proffered testimony is based on the ex-
pert's preexisting research, primarily because that reduces the
danger that the testimony is influenced by bias:
That an expert testifies based on research he has conduct-
ed independent of the litigation provides important, objective
proof that the research comports with the dictates of good
science. For one thing, experts whose findings flow from ex-
isting research are less likely to have been biased toward a
particular conclusion by the promise of remuneration; when
an expert prepares reports and findings before being hired as
a witness, that record will limit the degree to which he can
tailor his testimony to serve a party's interests. Then, too,
independent research carries its own indicia of reliability, as
it is conducted, so to speak, in the usual course of business
and must normally satisfy a variety of standards to attract
funding and institutional support. Finally, there is usually a
limited number of scientists actively conducting research on
the very subject that is germane to a particular case, which
provides a natural constraint on parties' ability to shop for
experts who will come to the desired conclusion.0
28. Some of these lower-court decisions are discussed in Part II of this Article. See
infra text accompanying notes 54-174.
29. The differences between the scientific and legal contexts are discussed in Part
HI of this Article. See infra text accompanying notes 175-84.
30. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1995)
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This test is discussed further below,3 ' but the focus of this sec-
tion is on the basic assumption underlying it: that "independent
research carries its own indicia of reliability." 2 This claim seems
to reflect an idealized view of the research enterprise, apparent-
ly presupposing that no scientific research conducted indepen-
dent of litigation is subject to the sort of result-oriented biases
that can be problematic in litigation. This idealized view has two
specific problems.
First, scientific research is not conducted in a vacuum. Even
when such research is conducted independent of "litigation," it is
not necessarily conducted free of conflicts of interest. For exam-
ple, is research funded by the tobacco companies research con-
ducted "independent of litigation"?33 More generally, is research
on a product that is funded by the product's manufacturer, as
much drug research is,3 4 conducted "independent of litigation"?
This problem is especially important because the relevant ques-
tion in considering the admissibility of scientific testimony is not
whether research conducted in connection with litigation is as
reliable as all research conducted independent of litigation.
Courts are only called upon to consider the admissibility of re-
search proffered in litigation, so the relevant question is wheth-
er research conducted in connection with litigation-and prof-
fered there-is as reliable as the subset of independent research
that is proffered in litigation. As much of the latter class of re-
search is conducted or funded by interested parties, it potential-
ly is subject to the same biases as research related to litigation.
Second, it is not clear that the Ninth Circuit's basic assump-
tion, even as it is stated, is correct; that is, it is not clear that
research conducted independent of litigation is more reliable, as
presented in court, than research conducted in connection with
litigation. The assumption seems facially plausible, but it is less
(citation omitted).
31. See infra text accompanying notes 95-100.
32. Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1317.
33. See supra note 1.
34. See PhRMA, Domestic U.S. R&D and U.S. R&D Abroad, Ethical Pharma-
ceuticals, Research-Based Pharmaceutical Companies, 1994-1998 (visited Jan. 28,
1999) <http'J/www.phrma.org/pdf/publications/industrypdf98/tables.pdf>.
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convincing when one realizes that even if the sponsors and re-
searchers that create "independent" research are subject to no
conflicts of interest, their research often will be presented in
court by an expert employed by a party to the litigation, not by
an unbiased source who might present its flaws as well as its
strengths. One might even wonder whether research that is con-
ducted in connection with litigation, and that is therefore con-
ducted with the knowledge that it will be subject to the scrutiny
of an opposing party, might be more reliable than that per-
formed independent of litigation. Scientists in fact bemoan the
lack of scrutiny that is applied to most published research."5 To
some extent, litigation can remedy this lack of scrutiny, but the
underlying data that would allow a careful review is not always
available, and actually it often will be more available when re-
search is conducted for litigation."
In any case, the Supreme Court's Daubert decision rests on
the view that courts should look to scientific standards to deter-
35. See e.g., FOSTER & HUBER, supra note 4, at 175-82.
36. See, e.g., Symposium, Court-Ordered Disclosure of Academic Research: A Clash
of Values of Science and Law, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1996, at 1-191.
This situation recently, though perhaps temporarily, changed for federally fund-
ed research. The omnibus appropriations act for fiscal year 1999 included a provision
directing the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) "to require Federal awarding
agencies to ensure that all data produced under an award will be made available to
the public through the procedures established under the Freedom of Information
Act," upon payment of a "reasonable user fee." Omnibus Consolidated and Emergen-
cy Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 117(d), 112 Stat.
2681 (1998). The OMB has not yet implemented this requirement, however, and a
bill has been introduced in the current Congress to repeal it. See H.R. 88, 106th
Cong. (1999).
This disclosure provision, if it survives, will probably do little to address the
problem discussed in this Article. The conflicts discussed here arise most frequently
in privately funded, not federally funded, research. The provision would provide dis-
closure in some circumstances of potential conflict, however, as when scientists re-
ceive federal funding for research on a topic with which they have some other finan-
cial connection. For example, a scientist might receive federal funding for research
on a drug produced by a company with which the scientist has an ongoing financial
relationship. In such a case, disclosure might be valuable in allowing the detection
of choices in conducting the research that might bias its results. When a potential
conflict like this exists, however, it is more appropriate to require the party using
the research in litigation to provide the underlying data rather than to require the
party opposing the research to use FOTA to gain access to the data. See infra text
accompanying notes 221-22.
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mine whether proffered testimony is "good science."3 1 It does not
support the Daubert II position that all "independent" science is
reliable; that is, it does not support the view that pure science is
good science. Daubert provided a list of science-based criteria for
telling good science from bad science precisely because the issue
is not so simple. 8 When weighing the implications of conflicts of
interest in the admissibility calculus, courts therefore should
consider all conflicts, not just those connected with litigation.
C. Conflicts of Interest and Scientific Validity
Scientists do many things. As Daubert II noted, one of those
things is research. 9 Contrary to the apparent suggestion of
Daubert 11,40 though, scientists also assess and evaluate the re-
search of their colleagues, much as expert witnesses do when
testifying on the basis of research that they themselves did not
conduct.4' In doing this, scientists share the concerns of Daubert
II about conflicts of interest in the interpretation of research, as
the following comments from The Lancet, a leading medical jour-
nal, indicate:
[Wlhen interpretation does prove difficult, we turn to an "ex-
pert", which is why medical journals publish editorials, com-
mentaries, and reviews. Editors select writers according to
their reputation, academic performance, and independence.
In truth, such criteria are vague and entirely subjective-the
.skill, or bias, of the editor in making these selections is criti-
cal.
Yet editors find it increasingly difficult to identify academ-
ic experts who have not crossed over to the commercial world
in some way .... So, should the opinions of researchers who
37. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-95 (1993) (dis-
cussing the factors courts must use to determine "scientific validity").
38. See id. at 593-94.
39. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1995).
40. See id. ("[A] scientist's workplace is the lab or the field, not the courtroom or
the lawyer's office.").
41. In addition to the review articles and editorials discussed here, scientists also
assess the work of their colleagues in the peer review process. See FOSTER & HUBER,
supra note 4, at 163-205 (describing the process of peer review of scientific research).
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have collaborated with industry be disqualified from the pag-
es of journals?42
These comments suggest a concern almost opposite that of
Daubert II. Whereas Daubert II expressed skepticism regarding
the testimony of those who have not conducted research on the
subject of their testimony prior to offering their opinions,' the
editors of The Lancet expressed concern about accepting the
opinions of those who have done research for, or otherwise "col-
laborated with," an interested party.'
In fact, the Lancet editorial was prompted by a dispute among
scientists over the significance of conflicts that would not have
been a concern under Daubert II. Specifically, it was prompted
by an editorial in the New England Journal of Medicine (NEJM)
that appeared in the same issue as a study showing risks from
the use of weight-loss drugs such as fenfluramine derivatives.45
The NEJM editorial contended that these risks "appear[ to be
outweighed" by the benefits of the weight loss that they pro-
duce.46 It subsequently was revealed, however, that the authors
of the editorial had been paid consultants to a manufacturer and
some distributors of dexfenfluramine." The authors had not dis-
closed these consulting arrangements to NEJM because they did
not believe that the terms of NEJM's disclosure requirement
covered the arrangements.4" The policy requires that editorial
writers "'not have ongoing financial associations (including eq-
42. The Politics of Disclosure, 348 LANCET 627, 627 (1996).
43. See Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1317.
44. The Politics of Disclosure, supra note 42, at 627.
45. See JoAnn E. Manson & Gerald A. Faich, Pharmacotherapy for Obesity-Do
the Benefits Outweigh The Risks?, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 659, 659 (1996) (editorial);
Lucien Abenheim et al., Appetite-Suppressant Drugs and the Risk of Primary Pulmo-
nary Hypertension, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 609, 610-14 (1996) (study). Fenfluramine
is one-half of the "fen-phen" diet drug combination, and it was recently withdrawn
from the market in response to a request ,by the Food and Drug Administration. See
John Schwartz, 2 Diet Drugs Are Pulled Off Market: Health Concerns Grow After
FDA Links Pills to Rare Heart Problem, WASH. POST, Sept. 16, 1997, at Al.
46. See Manson & Faich, supra note 45, at 660.
47. See Marcia Angell & Jerome P. Kassirer, Editorials and Conflicts of Interest,
335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1055, 1055-56 (1996).
48. See JoAnn E. Manson & Gerald A. Faich, Conflicts of Interest-Editorialists
Respond, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1064, 1064 (1996); see also JoAnn E. Manson, Ad-
ventures in Scientific Discourse, 8 EPIDEMIOLOGY 324 (1997).
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uity interest, regular consultancies, or major research support)
with a company that produces a product (or its competitor) dis-
cussed in the editorial. '""9 Because the authors believed that
their consulting arrangements were neither "ongoing" nor "regu-
lar," they did not report them.50 The NEJM editorial staff, how-
ever, believed that the arrangements should have been dis-
closed.5
For present purposes, the important point is not which of
these views is correct; it is that the NEJM considers these con-
sulting arrangements, and others like them, sufficiently prob-
lematic to require a policy governing them. The NEJM is not
alone in this respect. Scientific institutions have adopted a vari-
ety of policies governing conflicts of interest in a wide range of
scientific activities, including research itself, peer review, and,
as in this example, the publication of reviews and editorials.52
These policies presumably reflect the views of the scientific com-
munity concerning the ways that conflicts can affect scientific
validity and, hence, under Daubert, evidentiary reliability."
II. THE TREATMENT OF CONFLICTS OF INTEREST BY COURTS AND
SCIENTIFIC INSTITUTIONS
Sources of bias in scientific expert testimony can be divided
into three categories. The first does not, strictly speaking, in-
volve conflicts of interest on the part of the experts, but it is
nevertheless a source of bias: parties to litigation control both
the testimony presented and, often, the scientific research that
is the basis of that testimony. For example, an interested party
might select experts who will present testimony favorable to the
party's point of view rather than purely objective testimony, or it
might choose to fund only research that it believes will reach
49. Angell & Kassirer, supra note 47, at 1056 (quoting letter allegedly sent to "ac-
cused" editorialists by NEJM editors prior to publication).
50. See Manson & Faich, supra note 48, at 1064.
51. See Angell & Kassirer, supra note 47, at 1056.
52. See FOSTER & HUBER, supra note 4, at 86-87 (quoting Eliot Marshall, When
Does Intellectual Passion Become Conflict of Interest?, SCIENCE, July 31, 1992, at 620);
infra text accompanying notes 71, 91-93, 103-09, 111-14, 129-34, 156-68.
53. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 n.9 (1993)
(stating that "evidentiary reliability will be based on scientific validity").
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results favorable to its position. The second problem is a more
traditional conflict of interest: the inclination of experts to give
testimony that favors a party or position in which the experts
have a financial interest. The third problem is the possibility
that the underlying research record itself may be distorted by
conflicts of interest.
A. Bias in the Selection of the Expert
The most obvious potential bias in expert testimony is that
presented by an expert who says what his client-or his client's
lawyer-wants him to say, simply because the client is paying
for the expert's services. This sort of bias can take two forms.
The first is the problem presented when an expert whose true
views are A testifies to B in an effort to curry favor with his cli-
ent or to influence the outcome of the case for some other rea-
son. This is a true conflict of interest, and it will be discussed in
a later section.54 The other problem, discussed immediately be-
low, involves the expert who is not misrepresenting his actual
opinion-perhaps he has none-but is simply providing whatev-
er testimony his client desires.
From reading judicial opinions, one might think that this
problem is the primary source of bias in scientific expert testi-
mony. The courts regularly say that an expert should not be a
"professional witness,"55 a "hired gun,"56 or an "advocate[] for a
cause."5" To the extent that these labels refer to distinct phe-
54. See infra text accompanying notes 94-114.
55. See Lust v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 89 F.3d 594, 597 (9th Cir. 1996) ("pro-
fessional plaintiffs witness"); Thomas J. Kline, Inc. v. Lorillard, Inc., 878 F.2d 791,
800 (4th Cir. 1989) ("professional expert"); Eymard v. Pan Am. World Airways (In re
Air Crash Disaster), 795 F.2d 1230, 1234 (5th Cir. 1986) ("professional expert");
Tokio Marine & Fire Ins. Co. v. Grove Mfg. Co., 762 F. Supp. 1016, 1018 (D.P.R.
1991) ("professional witness"), affd, 958 F.2d 1169 (1st Cir. 1992).
56. Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984, 991 (5th Cir. 1997) (noting that the
"application of the Daubert factors is germane to evaluating whether the expert is a
hired gun or a person whose opinion in the courtroom will withstand the same scru-
tiny that it would among his professional peers").
57. Johnston v. United States, 597 F. Supp. 374, 411 (D. Kan. 1984) ("[IThis
Court must reject the testimony of Dr. Morgan and Dr. Gofman because they have
become advocates for a cause and have therefore departed from the ranks of objec-
tive expert witnesses."); see Rubinstein v. Marsh, No. CV-80-0177, 1987 WL 30608,
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nomena, in the end these phenomena are not as corrupting as
the labels would suggest, but derive simply from the fact that
experts must be paid and selected by their clients.58
1. The "Professional Witness"
An expert who is a "professional witness" is not necessarily
biased. Courts most often use this term to describe an expert
who "spends substantially all of his time consulting with attor-
neys and testifying."59 Independent of any bias such an expert
might have, spending all of his time testifying will inevitably
erode his scientific skills and knowledge, and he will become less
qualified to opine on the subject of his (former) expertise. A
court rightly might refuse to admit the testimony of such a wit-
ness because "he' is more a professional witness than an ex-
pert."0 Strictly speaking, though, the court would not be reject-
ing the witness's testimony itself; the court instead would be
deciding that the proposed witness is not qualified as an expert
at all.
No issue of bias necessarily exists here, at least on the part of
the witness. It is true that if a "professional witness" is one who
lacks real scientific competence, he may be more likely to testify
for the party whose position is less scientifically accepted, be-
cause that party will find it more difficult to hire competent
experts. That does not show that the witness is biased, though,
or that his testimony is false. It instead might be that "profes-
sional witnesses" can be found with a wide range of views,61 so
that the only bias in their use is in the universal selection by
parties of witnesses that will support their positions.
at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 1987) ("When expert witnesses become partisans, objectivity
is sacrificed to the need to win.").
58. The alternative, court-appointed experts, is discussed below. See infra text
accompanying notes 197-217.
59. Eymard, 795 F.2d at 1234.
60. Tokio Marine & Fire Ins. Co., 762 F. Supp. at 1018.
61. See infra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
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2. The "Hired Gun"
It is certainly true that the testimony of a "hired gun"--or, as
some courts put it, an expert who is "available to the highest
bidder"-is not "scientific knowledge" and therefore should be
inadmissible under Daubert.62 Given the frequency (and vehe-
mence) with which this danger is invoked, especially in the pop-
ular press,63 one might expect it to be a frequent focus of the
courts. In fact, though, courts are seldom concerned about this
issue, presumably because, as Daubert II recognized, "few ex-
perts appear in court merely as an eleemosynary gesture." 4 One
cannot use the mere fact that an expert is paid by his client as a
basis for inferring that his testimony is biased; one must look
more carefully at the expert's testimony to determine if it is bi-
ased, and once one makes that further inquiry, one is not relying
on the premise that the expert is a "hired gun."
Courts occasionally do claim to find the mere fact that an ex-
pert is paid to be a problem, 5 but comments along this line of-
62. Even before Daubert, the Eymard court wrote that those "whose opinions are
available to the highest bidder have no place testifying in a court of law, before a
jury, and with the imprimatur of the trial judge's decision that he is an 'expert.'"
Eymard, 795 F.2d at 1234.
63. See MARCIA ANGELL, SCIENCE ON TRIAL: THE CLASH OF MEDICAL EVIDENCE AND THE
LAW IN THE BREAST IMPLANT CASE 133 (1996); Max Boot, "Expert" for Hire, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 22, 1996, at A14.
64. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1995). The
Ninth Circuit also wrote, however, that the fact "[t]hat an expert testifies for money
does not necessarily cast doubt on the reliability of his testimony," id. (emphasis
added), suggesting that being paid to testify might cause additional skepticism by
the courts.
Of course, if an expert's testimony were really available "to the highest bidder,"
bias would be present. If this concern were interpreted broadly, it would include
within its reach witnesses that critics of expert testimony probably do not intend to
condemn. In the recent Microsoft antitrust litigation, Richard Schmalensee, the dean
of the Sloan School of Management at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, ap-
peared as a witness for Microsoft and, when confronted with some earlier writings
that contradicted his testimony, responded, "What could I have been thinking?"
Transcript of Proceedings, United States v. Microsoft Corp., (Nos. 1:98cv1232,
1:98cv1233) (D.D.C. Jan. 14., 1999), available in 1999 WL 15436, at *37; see also
John R. Wilke & Keith Perine, Economist Testifies Microsoft Confronts Myriad
Threats to Its Windows Software, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 1999, at B6.
65. See Lust v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 89 F.3d 594, 597-98 (9th Cir. 1996)
("It is not unreasonable to presume that Done's opinion on Clomid was influenced by
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ten do not appear to be well thought out. For example, in reject-
ing an expert's testimony, a federal district judge observed that
"the fact that [the expert] was hired by [the plaintiffs] counsel
further taints the validity of her findings."6 This statement sug-
gests that the court considered the testimony less reliable simply
because the expert was "hired" by counsel to give it. To support
the statement, though, the court quoted the Ninth Circuit's com-
ment in Daubert 11 that "'a scientist's normal workplace is the
lab or the field, not the courtroom or the lawyer's office.'"6 To
interpret this comment as support for the proposition that a
scientist who is "hired" to "work" in the courtroom is thereby
less reliable surely goes further than Daubert II intended. As
noted above, Daubert II explicitly recognized that experts are
frequently paid to testify, and it did not suggest that their testi-
mony is less admissible as a result.68
Following Daubert, courts might look to the standards of the
scientific community to determine the propriety of being paid to
testify.69 Scientists do not view payment for testimony as im-
proper. For example, the American Medical Association (AMA)
claims that "the physician has an ethical obligation to assist in
the administration of justice"7 0 and recognizes that payment is
part of the process, condemning only payment of an expert on a
contingency basis.7' Other organizations also recognize that their
a litigation-driven financial incentive."); Johnston v. United States, 597 F. Supp. 374,
411 (D. Kan. 1984) ("Indeed, given his $500.00 per day expert witness fee, one must
wonder who is partisan!").
66. Washington v. Vogel, 880 F. Supp. 1545, 1548 (M.D. Fla. 1995).
67. Id. (quoting Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1317).
68. See supra text accompanying note 64; see also Eymard v. Pan Am. World Air-
ways (In re Air Crash Disaster), 795 F.2d 1230, 1234 (5th Cir. 1986) ("That a per-
son spends substantially all of his time consulting with attorneys and testifying is
not a disqualification.").
69. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589-90, 592-93 (1993)
(noting that courts must make a preliminary assessment of whether evidence has
"grounding in the methods and procedures of science").
70. COUNCIL ON ETHICAL & JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AM. MED. AssW, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS:
CURRENT OPINIONS WITH ANNOTATIONS § 9.07 (1997) [hereinafter AMA, CODE OF MEDICAL
ETHICS].
71. See id. One could view an expert who testifies regularly as doing so on a con-
tingency basis. See HUBER, supra note 9, at 18 ('A witness may not work directly for
a contingent fee, but the expert is a contingent player anyway, and he knows it. His
continued employment today, and reemployment tomorrow, depend critically on the
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members will offer testimony,72 and some even have no explicit
ban on contingent-fee arrangements.73
Moreover, litigation is not the only context in which scientists
are paid to express a particular scientific position. For example,
some physicians and scientists are paid by drug companies to
promote the drug companies' products. 4 Although some scien-
strength of the support he can supply."). See infra text accompanying notes 95-100
for a discussion of this issue.
72. For example, the National Society of Professional Engineers (NSPE) recognizes
that its members may provide testimony in requiring that "[elngineers shall be ob-
jective and truthful in professional reports, statements or testimony." NATIONAL SOcY
OF PROF'L ENG RS, CODE OF ETHICS FOR ENGINEERS § II.3.a (1996). The NSPE's Code of
Ethics does not explicitly forbid contingent fees, but it does provide for disclosure of
fee arrangements:
Engineers shall issue no statements, criticisms, or arguments on technical
matters that are inspired or paid for by interested parties, unless they
have prefaced their comments by explicitly identifying the interested par-
ties on whose behalf they are speaking, and by revealing the existence of
any interest the engineers may have in the matters.
Id. § II.3.c.
73. See supra note 72. Paying witnesses on a contingent basis, however, generally
runs contrary to legal rules of ethics. The Model Code of Professional Responsibility
of the American Bar Association (ABA) provides that "[a] lawyer shall not pay, offer
to pay, or acquiesce in the payment of compensation to a witness contingent upon
the content of his testimony or the outcome of the case." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-109(C) (1980). The ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct
eliminate this prohibition, stating only that "[a] lawyer shall not.., offer an in-
ducement to a witness that is prohibited by law," MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CON-
DUCT Rule 3.4(b) (1983), but they note in a comment that "[t]he common law rule in
most jurisdictions is . . . that it is improper to pay an expert witness a contingent
fee." Id. at Rule 3.4 cmt.
Two bills have been introduced in Congress proposing to amend Federal Rule of
Evidence 702 to make expert testimony inadmissible if the expert is paid on a con-
tingent basis. House Bill 903, introduced in the 105th Congress, provides that
"[tiestimony by a witness who is qualified as described in subdivision (a) is inadmis-
sible in evidence if the witness is entitled to receive any compensation contingent on
the legal disposition of any claim with respect to which the testimony is offered."
H.R. 903, 105th Cong. § 4(2) (1997). A Senate bill was similar. See S. 79, 105th
Cong. § 302(2) (1997).
74. See Elyse Tanouye, Off the Label: Staffers of Drug Maker Say It Pushed Prod-
uct for Unapproved Uses, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 1997, at Al (discussing the case of a
"physician and professor of medicine" who "spends much of his time on speaking
engagements" promoting the drugs of Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, which pays him "up to
$1500" for each speech).
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tists object to this practice,75 it apparently violates no ethical
rules.76
Thus, there is no indication that scientists question the "scien-
tific validity" of an expert's testimony simply because the expert
is paid by the litigant for whom she testifies. That is not to deny
that some paid experts do offer testimony that cannot properly
be called scientific and therefore should be excluded. Courts nev-
ertheless should not exclude testimony simply because the ex-
pert proffering it is paid to do so. Those courts that use the
"hired gun" epithet would do better to focus either on the merits
of the proffered testimony or, as Daubert directs, on consider-
ations that actually do affect scientific validity.
This, in fact, is the approach being taken by the AMA. In a
recent report, the AMA's board of trustees observed that
"[e]conomic incentives can color the nature of the physician ex-
pert's testimony."77 The AMA is not addressing this problem by
75. See, e.g., Richard F. LeBlond, Letter to the Editor, 266 JAMA 61 (1991).
76. The AMA has established rules governing a physician's receipt of gifts, see
AMA, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 70, § 8.061, but these rules are aimed at
gifts that might influence physicians' prescription practices, and they do not seem to
cover paid marketing of drugs by physicians. See id. A letter written in response to
AMA promulgation of these rules objected on exactly this point:
Many university faculty members and prominent practicing physi-
cians serve as paid consultants to major pharmaceutical houses and trav-
el around the country giving seminars and educational conferences that
are frequently, although not always, thinly veiled promotions for partic-
ular products. In doing so, they exercise their rights as individuals to
contract for services, but they also abrogate their responsibilities as
faculty members to pursue an impartial view of medical research and
therapy.
LeBlond, supra note 75, at 61. The AMA's Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs
responded that it had addressed the issue of physicians serving as consultants to
industry in another report. See Richard J. McMurray & David Orentlicher, In Reply,
266 JAMA 63, 63 (1991) (citing Council on Scientific Affairs and Council on Ethical
and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association, Conflicts of Interest in Medical
Center/Industry Research Relationships, 263 JAMA 2790 (1990) [hereinafter AMA,
Conflicts of Interest]). That report, however, did not in fact address the issue, or did
so only superficially, recommending that in these cases "the researcher's remunera-
tion is commensurate with his or her actual efforts on behalf of the company." Id. at
2793.
77. Report of the AMA Board of Trustees 5-A-98 (visited Jan. 8, 1999)
<http-//www.ama-assn.org/meetings/public/annual98/reports/bot/bot05.htm> [hereinafter
AMA Report].
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focusing on these economic incentives, though. Instead, it is fo-
cusing on the substance of the testimony, by declaring false tes-
timony "intolerable" and developing a peer-review system to dis-
cipline physicians who give such false testimony.7"
3. The Advocate for a Cause
Although the courts sometimes invoke the dangers of the "pro-
fessional witness" and the "hired gun," the real legal problems
with expert testimony are more subtle. Even the most vehement
critics of litigants' use of scientific expert testimony acknowledge
that litigants usually do not need to influence their experts. On
the contrary, a litigant usually can find an expert who will ex-
press the view that the litigant wants to have expressed. 79 Nor
does this necessarily suggest that the expert is biased, even if
the testimony is a minority view: "Some of these experts are un-
doubtedly motivated by financial concerns; others may simply
possess eccentric viewpoints." 0
The ability of a litigant to select an expert who already holds
views favorable to the litigant's position presents difficult prob-
lems. Certainly courts should not exclude any and all testimony
by an expert who has formed an opinion on a scientific issue. In
fact, one might well think that such experts will provide the
most objective-i.e., uninfluenced by litigation-testimony. As
the court in Daubert II noted, "when an expert prepares reports
and findings before being hired as a witness, that record will
limit the degree to which he can tailor his testimony to serve a
78. See id.; Michael Higgins, Docking Doctors?: AMA Eyes Discipline for Physicians
Giving Ralse' Testimony, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1998, at 20.
79. As Judge Jack Weinstein puts it, experts "can be found to testify to the truth
of almost any factual theory, no matter how frivolous." Jack B. Weinstein, Improving
Expert Testimony, 20 U. RICH. L. REV. 473, 482 (1986); see also Peter Huber, Safety
and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85
COLUm. L. REV. 277, 333 (1985) ("The scientific community is large and heteroge-
neous, and a Ph.D. can be found to swear to almost any 'expert' proposition, no
matter how false or foolish.").
80. David Bernstein, Note, Out of the Fryeing Pan and into the Fire: The Expert
Witness Problem in Toxic Tort Litigation, 10 REV. L1TIG. 117, 121 (1990).
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party's interests."8 This seems no less true when the position
the expert is advocating is a minority one.
From the perspective of the scientific community, it is not "un-
scientific" to advocate a particular scientific position, even an
unpopular one.82 A scientist can advocate, strongly and over a
long period of time, a minority point of view, and no one sug-
gests that he is thereby made unscientific. A prominent example
is Peter Duesberg, who for many years has claimed that the HIV
retrovirus does not cause AIDS. 3 He published his views in sev-
eral scientific journals, including Cancer Research" and the Pro-
ceedings of the National Academy of Sciences,85 and they were
debated in Science.86 More importantly, perhaps, he expressed
his views in traditional scientific terms, arguing, for example,
that the HIV causation theory did not satisfy Koch's postu-
lates,"7 probably the best-known and most widely accepted medi-
cal causation criteria. This does not mean that he is correct, of
course, but it does indicate that an expert can hold a minority
view regarding a scientific question-and hold it for a long
time-without the expert (or the view) becoming unscientific.
It remains true, however, that "[wiorking scientists can and
do readily identify peers whom they regard as having become
advocates, no longer capable of reading evidence in an even-
handed way."8 8 Some scientific institutions seek to address the
81. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1995).
82. In addition to the example discussed in the text, see AMA Report, supra note
77 ("Because medicine is both a science and an art with a dynamic body of knowl-
edge, theories held by a minority of the medical community may not necessarily be
'junk science,' and instead could be an evolving scientific consensus.").
83. For a history of Duesberg's advocacy of this position and the responses of oth-
er scientists, see STEVEN EPSTEIN, IMPURE SCIENCE: AIDS, ACTIVISM, AND THE POLITICS OF
KNOWLEDGE 105-78 (1996). For a complete discussion of Duesberg's position, see PETER
DUESBERG, INVENTING THE AIDS VIRUS (1996).
84. See Peter H. Duesberg, Retroviruses as Carcinogens and Pathogens: Expecta-
tions and Reality, 47 CANCER RES. 1199 (1987).
85. See Peter H. Duesberg, Human Immunodeficiency Virus and Acquired Immu-
nodeficiency Syndrome: Correlation but not Causation, 86 PROC. OF THE NAT'L ACAD. OF
Sci. 755 (1989).
86. See Peter H. Duesberg, HIV is Not the Cause of Aids, 241 SCIENCE 514 (1988);
Blattner et al., Blattner and Colleagues Respond to Duesberg, 241 SCIENCE 514 (1988).
87. See EPSTEIN, supra note 83, at 75, 137-38.
88. Marshall, supra note 52, at 620.
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problems these sorts of "intellectual conflicts" create.8 9 For ex-
ample, the National Research Council notes that "[t]he conflicts
of interest that arise most frequently concern individual points
of view on especially contentious issues," and that it deals with
the problem by "selecting a carefully balanced group so that all
points of view can be represented."" Interestingly, this approach
is similar to the adversary process of litigation, and it therefore
suggests that intellectual conflicts should not disqualify a wit-
ness from testifying, at least if scientific standards are to control
legal practice.
The approach science takes in another context supports this
point of view. Studies have shown that industry support of Con-
tinuing Medical Education (CME) programs can influence the
content of those programs.9 Presumably due to concerns about
such issues, the AMA and the Accreditation Council for Continu-
ing Medical Education (ACCME) have decided that commercial
CME sponsors should have no voice in determining which speak-
ers appear at CME programs.92 The difference between the AMA
89. Several recent articles, however, have suggested that these problems are not
easily solved. See Carl C. Seltzer, 'Conflicts of Interest" and 'Political Science," 50 J.
CLIN. EPIDEMIOLOGY 627, 627-28 (1997) (describing the NIH's objections to publication
of research, based on data obtained in NIH-funded research, indicating that the con-
sumption of moderate amounts of alcohol could reduce coronary heart disease); Gary
Taubes, The (Political) Science of Salt, 281 SCIENCE 898, 898-907 (1988) (describing
the federal government's history of advising citizens to avoid salt in order to reduce
hypertension, despite many scientists' beliefs that the advice is not supported by
scientific evidence).
90. The National Research Council Process (visited Oct. 10, 1998) <http://www.nas.
edulaboutlfaq4.html>. The Council reports that "Mconflicts stemming from financial
interests arise less frequently." Id. Both kinds of conflicts must be disclosed: "At the
time of appointment, each committee member is required to list all professional, con-
sulting, and financial connections, as well as to describe pertinent intellectual posi-
tions and public statements by filling out a confidential form, 'Potential Sources of
Bias and Conflict of Interest.'" National Research Council Institute of Medicine, Get-
ting to Know the Committee Process (visited Oct. 6, 1998) <http//www2.nas.edul
bbhome/2122.html>.
91. See David S. Sbimm et al., Conflicts of Interest in Relationships Between Phy-
sicians and the Pharmaceutical Industry, in CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN CLINICAL PRACTICE
AND RESEARCH 321, 326 (Roy G. Spece, Jr. et al. eds, 1996).
92. See AMA, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 70, § 8.061 ("[Wihen companies
underwrite medical conferences or lectures other than their own, responsibility for
and control over the selection of content, faculty, educational methods, and materials
should belong to the organizers of the conference or lectures."); Accreditation Council
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position in this context and its position regarding expert wit-
nesses-who are selected by those who pay them-presumably is
related to the presentation of CME programs as objective infor-
mation. In other words, it is precisely because a CME speaker is
not clearly a hired gun that the speaker's possible bias presents
a danger.93
In sum, the problems of the payment and selection of scientif-
ic expert witnesses are not unique to litigation. They also are
present in science (and, indeed, throughout society). That does
not mean that these problems can be dismissed, but it does sug-
gest that they are not so subtle as to be beyond the capacity of
legal fact finders to appreciate. It is the less obvious conflicts
that are likely to present greater difficulty.
B. Conflicts for the Expert Testifying
In considering bias in expert testimony, the usual focus is the
witnesses' conflicts of interest.94 Most obviously, this sort of con-
flict of interest can arise when the expert has a financial inter-
for Continuing Medical Education, Standards for Commercial Support of Continuing
Medical Education (visited Oct. 6, 1998) <httpJ/www.accme.org/essentcommerce.htm>.
The FDA recently issued a document providing guidance to the pharmaceutical
industry on these matters. See Final Guidance on Industry-Supported Scientific and
Educational Activities, 62 Fed. Reg. 64,073 (1997). The FDA does not regulate "truly
independent and nonpromotional industry-supported [scientific and educational] activ-
ities" because those activities are not subject to its jurisdiction over labeling and
advertising. Id. at 64,094. This limitation on its jurisdiction requires the FDA to de-
termine whether an activity is independent:
The agency will consider whether the provider has maintained full
control over the content of the program, planning of the program's con-
tent, and over the selection of speakers and moderators.... In addition,
the agency will consider if the company has suggested speakers who are
or were actively involved in promoting the company's products or who
have been the subject of complaints or objections with regard to presenta-
tions that were viewed as misleading or biased in favor of the company's
products.
Id. at 64,097.
93. See Shimm et al., supra note 91, at 325 ("[Uinlike gift giving or advertising,
CME usually takes place under the aegis of a legitimate and supposedly neutral
academic or professional institution or organization, so that physicians listening to
presentations are much less likely to suspect bias in the information.").
94. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir.
1995); FOSTER & HUBER, supra note 4, at 207-24; HUBER, supra note 9, at 198-209.
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est either in the outcome of the case in which he is testifying or
in the results of the research about which he testifies. This sec-
tion describes the possibility of conflicts that arise when a wit-
ness has an expectation of future employment as an expert wit-
ness-the probable concern of Daubert II-and then focuses on
other relationships that can cause an expert to skew his testimo-
ny, as well as the approach the scientific community takes in
handling these relationships.
1. Testimony Distorted by an Expert's Expectation of Future
Testimony
The conflict created by a witness's expectation of future testi-
mony was probably the primary concern of the Ninth Circuit in
Daubert II. When the court wrote of the "promise of remunera-
tion" for the expert, it presumably was focusing on remuneration
from being hired in future cases.9" An expert's remuneration in a
given case is not likely to depend on his testimony because ex-
perts generally are not paid with contingent fees,96 but whether
the expert is hired again indeed might depend on his testimony.
One might expect a test addressing this problem to focus on
the ongoing relationships between experts and their clients or
their clients' lawyers. Opposing lawyers routinely cross-examine
expert witnesses on these relationships, and fact finders may
consider the possibility that it is the relationship,'and the expec-
tation of its continuance, rather than the facts that more power-
fully influences the expert's testimony. The problem is that, given
the perceptions of laypersons that science is objective, cross-
examination might not be enough.
95. Cf supra text accompanying notes 65-68 (discussing the inference of bias from
the mere fact that an expert was paid).
96. See supra note 73. But see Paul D. Carrington & Traci L. Jones, Reluctant
Experts, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1996, at 51, 55-56 ("While expert witness-
es cannot, consistently with lawyers' ethical duties, be employed on a contingent fee
basis, more than a few such experts know that there is little prospect that their cli-
ent will be able to pay their fees unless they prevail on the merits at trial." (foot-
note omitted)); Michelle M. Dillon, Contingent Fees and Medical-Legal Consulting
Services: Economical or Unethical?, 11 J. LEGAL MED. 93, 97, 108 (1990) (discussing
the payment of flat rates to expert witnesses by medical-legal consulting firms that
are compensated on a contingent basis by parties to litigation).
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Courts therefore reasonably might choose to rest admissibility
on some criterion that reflects the likelihood that an expert's
testimony is intended to promote his future employment as a
witness. Courts, for example, might ask whether the expert has
significant employment outside his role as a witness. If not, the
expert presumably relies primarily on giving testimony for in-
come and therefore might be motivated to provide testimony
that would preserve that income. Such a test would be consis-
tent with the reasoning in Daubert II, which focused on whether
the expert is testifying about research conducted independent of
litigation." If an expert does little other than testify, any re-
search he actually does conduct most likely would be done in
connection with litigation.
The Daubert II test, however, also would cover legitimate sci-
entists hired to conduct research in connection with litigation.
Even if these scientists have no expectation of, or desire for, fu-
ture employment as expert witnesses, they could be prevented
from testifying by the Daubert II standard. This view that the
Daubert II test is overbroad is consistent with scientific practice.
For example, there is no requirement that the authors of editori-
als and review articles, the publications that most closely resem-
ble expert testimony," have themselves performed any of the
research that they discuss.99
Even experts who do little research beyond their work in con-
nection with litigation cannot always anticipate future employ-
ment if their testimony is satisfactory. For example, the case in
which an expert testifies might be the only one in which the
subject of the expert's testimony is at issue, or it might be a na-
tionwide class action that will resolve all related claims. In ei-
97. See Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1317.
98. The New England Journal of Medicine states that "the essence of reviews and
editorials is selection and interpretation of the literature." New England Journal of
Medicine, Information for Authors (visited Oct. 6, 1998) <httpl/www.nejm.orglgeneral/
text/InfoAuth.htm> [hereinafter NEJM, Information for Authors].
99. See Journal of the American Medical Association, JAMA Instructions for Au-
thors (visited Oct. 6, 1998) <http://www.ama-assn.org/publicjournals/jama/mstruct.
htm#-categories> [hereinafter JAMA Instructions for Authors] (discussing reviews);
Writing for The Lancet (visited Oct. 15, 1998) <httpj//www.thelancet.com/newlancetl
reg/author/writingl.html> [hereinafter Writing for The Lancet] (discussing commen-
taries and review articles).
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ther case, because there would be no future opportunities to offer
testimony on the same topic,1°° it is difficult to see why the ex-
pert would have an incentive to skew his testimony.
At the very least, then, a test that focuses on whether the ex-
pert testifying performed the research about which he testifies
in connection with litigation also should incorporate some refer-
ence to the likelihood that the expert expects future employment
as a witness. Only then will the test really address the sorts of
conflicts that it presumably intends to reach. For example, a
better-focused test might ask whether the expert's research,
even if performed in connection with litigation, is related to non-
litigation work that he has done and will continue to do. In that
case, the court presumably could be more confident both that the
expert had real expertise and that he might suffer costs from
misusing that expertise. The test also might attempt to deter-
mine, as suggested above, whether the expert could reasonably
anticipate future employment in offering similar testimony. In-
corporating these questions into the test complicates it, of
course, but that is the cost of fitting the test to the real prob-
lems in expert testimony.
100. It is still possible that the expert could anticipate testifying in other cases on
other topics. An extreme example was discussed in Tokio Marine & Fire Ins. Co. v.
Grove Mfg. Co., 958 F.2d 1169, 1174 (1st Cir. 1992).
Alterman admitted to having testified as a professed expert in an ex-
traordinary array of dissimilar fields: construction safety, scaffolding, real
estate appraisals on industrial facilities, fire protection systems, bulk oil
terminals, cargo waterfront terminals, bridges, high rise construction, con-
struction of highways, construction of race tracks, the field of construction
management, the field of drainage projects, construction of containerized
cargo facilities, the field of construction estimating, the field of waste
treatment plants and water treatment plants, industrial buildings, wire
ropes and wire cables, and opened wedged sockets.
Id. This, in fact, is one of the objections often raised to the testimony of "clinical
ecologists," who have testified that environmental chemicals have caused a broad
range of injuries. See infra note 291 and accompanying text. Daubert II, however,
offers no evidence to suggest that all experts can expect future employment if their
current testimony is satisfactory, so there does not seem to be a sufficient basis for
adopting a test that relies on an assumption that such expectations exist.
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2. Testimony Distorted by Other Conflicts of Interest
The Daubert II test is also underinclusive. Even if an expert
has previously conducted research on the subject about which he
testifies; he may have a financial interest in the results of the
case, or in one of the parties to the case. In fact, it seems more
likely that an expert who has previously conducted research on
a subject will have a financial interest in it. This is the case, for
example, when an employee testifies for his or her employer, yet
Daubert II expresses no concern about this problem. A reason to
ignore this problem, one might think, is that the future employ-
ment of a non-employee expert may depend more directly on his
testimony than does that of an employee expert. The client has
no need to employ a freelance expert who does not provide testi-
mony favorable to his case, whereas an expert who is also an
employee presumably provides other valuable services to his em-
ployer. The other side of the coin, though, is that the freelance
expert may have other clients or potential clients, so that he
might feel more free to provide testimony less favorable to a par-
ticular client than would an employee. Furthermore, as dis-
cussed below, the employee may be testifying about research
that he did himself for the company, and that research itself
may be biased.1 '
The existence of conflicts of interest in many circumstances
beyond litigation is reflected in scientific practice. In some cases,
as in the AMA ban on contingent fee arrangements for medical
experts, scientists consider this problem in the specific context of
expert testimony, but more often they focus on conflicts in other
contexts. Nevertheless, because many of these contexts involve
the reporting or evaluation of scientific evidence, as expert testi-
mony does, the policies of scientific institutions in these instanc-
es may indicate how scientists would treat similar conflicts of
scientific expert witnesses.
At the outset, it seems clear that scientists would view both
employment relationships and continuing expert witness rela-
tionships as presenting similar problems."°2 The conflict of inter-
101. See infra text accompanying notes 155-74.
102. As of 1995, some journals apparently saw no problem at all with either type
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est policies of most scientific journals and institutions require
authors to disclose continuing financial relationships, without
specifying what those relationships might be."' s An employment
relationship therefore presumably would be of as great a concern
as would a continuing expert witness relationship. One journal,
the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA), may
view expert-witness relationships with particular concern. JAMA
requires authors to disclose any "financial involvement," which it
defines to include "expert testimony."1°4 This might suggest that
any expert witness relationship, not just a continuing one, would
trigger concern about a conflict. This seems unlikely, though,
and the policies of other journals suggest that only continuing
relationships raise concerns. 0 5
Of course, that a journal requires disclosure of a conflict does
not mean that it uses the disclosed information in any way. In
most cases, the policies of scientific journals do not suggest that
of relationship, and did not require disclosure of such conflicts. See Sheldon Krimsky
& L.S. Rothenberg, Financial Interest and Its Disclosure in Scientific Publications,
280 JAMA 225, 226 (1998) (citing a survey of North American medical journal edi-
tors). The leading medical journals have disclosure requirements, though. See JAMA
Instructions for Authors, supra note 99; NEJM, Information for Authors, supra note
98; Writing for The Lancet, supra note 99. The voluntary Uniform Requirements for
Manuscripts Submitted to Biomedcal Journals also recommends such disclosure. See
Uniform Requirements for Manuscripts Submitted to Biomedical Journals (visited
Oct. 15, 1998) <http'/www.thelancet.com/newlancet/reg/author/uniforml.html> [here-
inafter Uniform Requirements]. Even when disclosure is required by journals, though,
authors may not comply. See Ralph T. King, Jr., Medical Journals Rarely Disclose
Researchers' Ties, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 1999, at B1.
103. For example, the New England Journal of Medicine asks authors of research
articles to submit information regarding "any financial arrangement they may have
with a company whose product figures prominently in the submitted manuscript or
with a company making a competing product." NEJM, Information for Authors, su-
pra note 98. The Journal of the American Medical Association requires authors to
disclose "affiliations with or financial involvement (e[.]g[.], employment, consultancies,
honoraria, stock ownership or options, expert testimony, grants or patents received
or pending, royalties) with any organization or entity with a financial interest in the
subject matter or materials discussed in the manuscript." JAMA, Authorship Criteria
and Responsibility, Financial Disclosure, Copyright Transfer and Acknowledgement
(visited Oct. 6, 1998) <httpJ/www.ama-assn.org/publicjournals/jama/jautform.htm>
[hereinafter JAMA, Authorship Criteria].
104. JAMA, Authorship Criteria, supra note 103.
105. See Writing for The Lancet, supra note 99; NEJM, Information for Authors,
supra note 98.
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the disclosure of a conflict would cause them to disqualify an
author, which would be analogous to holding an expert's testi-
mony inadmissible. On the contrary, many of the journals that
require authors to disclose conflicts to their editors do not even
disclose the conflict to their readers."6 If one were to follow the
Supreme Court's formulation in Daubert and apply the approach
of these journals to evidence, one might forbid inquiry into con-
flicts even on cross-examination. The policy of the journals, that
is, appears equivalent to a requirement that experts disclose
conflicts to the lawyers who hired them and to judges, but not
necessarily to jurors.
Initially, one might find this rather cavalier approach to con-
flicts unsurprising. After all, the scientific journals may believe
that, because their readership consists not of lay jurors, but of
practicing scientists who will judge the published articles on
their scientific merit, disclosure of conflicts would be unneces-
sary. The policies of one journal, however, suggest that the rele-
vant distinction is not that between laypersons and scientists
but between different kinds of scientific writing. A typical scien-
tific article purports only to set out facts, rather than, as with
expert testimony, opinion on some ultimate issue. The New Eng-
land Journal of Medicine (NEJM) distinguishes its standard ar-
ticles from expressions of opinion on exactly this ground:
Scientific reports are self-contained. They present original
data, and readers can judge for themselves whether the au-
thors' interpretations are supported by the data. Editorials
and review articles are different. They are not self-contained,
and there are no primary data. Instead, editorialists and au-
thors of review articles evaluate an issue on the basis of what
they select from the literature as relevant .... It is expected
106. See Writing for The Lancet, supra note 99 (stating only that the editors "will
discuss with [the authors] whether or not disclosure in the journal is necessary"); see
also King, supra note 102, at B1 (revealing that only 0.5% of over 62,000 articles
published in 1997 included information regarding authors' conflicts of interest);
NEJM, Information for Authors, supra note 98 (stating that the editors only discuss
with an author whether or how to communicate such a disclosure to the reader).
The Uniform Requirements for Manuscripts Submitted to Biomedical Journals, how-
ever, provides that "the information should be made available so that others can
judge their effects for themselves." Uniform Requirements, supra note 102.
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that they will provide an unbiased and authoritative opinion
about the matter. That is why we insist that editorialists
have no financial ties to products that figure prominently in
their work.10
7
NEJM's stated policy provides that editorialists should not have
"any financial interest in a company (or its competitor) that
makes a product discussed in the article."' The "standard let-
ter" that it sends to prospective editorialists states that the jour-
nal "ask[s] that authors not have ongoing financial associations
(including equity interest, regular consultancies, or major re-
search support)." °9
If one were to adopt NEJM's approach, then, one might not
allow testimony by any experts that had ongoing relationships
with parties to litigation or attorneys in the litigation. Of course,
cross-examination is not available for the editorials and review
articles in NEJM."° This may force the journal to be more care-
ful than otherwise necessary, opting for disqualification of the
author rather than simple disclosure of the conflict. In other cir-
cumstances in which cross-examination is permitted, it might be
sufficient to disclose any conflicts of interest and allow the cross-
examiner to pursue the issue.
A practice somewhat similar to cross-examination is used in
the reviews of research conducted by the scientific review
107. Angell & Kassirer, supra note 47, at 1055. See also The National Research
Council Process (visited Oct. 6, 1998) <http:J/www.nas.edulabout/faq4.html> ("The
[Council's] process is particularly aggressive in differentiating committee opinions and
judgments from findings of fact well-grounded in science"). Ironically, despite the
firm position of the NEJM on this issue, its editor Marcia Angell has expressed her
own, strongly critical opinion of the operation of the trial system in the ongoing sili-
cone-breast-implant litigation, see ANGELL, supra note 63, without revealing her own
interest in that litigation. See Medical Editor/Civil Justice Critic Doubles as Expert
Witness in Breast Implant Cases (Opinion), CIV. JUST. DIG. (Roscoe Pound Found.),
Fall 1996, at 2.
108. NEJM, Information for Authors, supra note 98.
109. Angell & Kassirer, supra note 47, at 1056. Although this was the language
that the journal used in 1996, it is not clear whether it currently uses the same
language.
110. Letters to the editors may serve to accomplish some of the purpose of cross-
examination, but they are obviously an imperfect substitute.
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groups, or "study sections," of the National Institutes of Health
(NIH). An application for an NIH grant is evaluated by a study
section "composed generally of 18 to 20 individuals, nominated
by the [Scientific Review Administrator of the study section]
from among the active and productive researchers in the bio-
medical community.""' The members of a study section debate
the merits of a proposal, so an individual member's comments
can be challenged by other members, much as cross-examination
challenges the statements made in testimony." Although a
study section evaluates the quality of a research proposal,
whereas an expert witness evaluates the results of research, the
two tasks involve many similar issues.13 The conflict policies of
the study sections are therefore at least potentially relevant to
the evaluation of expert testimony.
The NIH conflict of interest policy requires that "[a] member
must leave the room when an application submitted by his/her
own organization is being discussed or when the member,
his/her immediate family, or close professional associate(s) has a
financial or vested interest even if no significant involvement is
apparent in the proposal being considered."" As with the NEJM
111. A Straightforward Description of What Happens to Your Research Project Grant
Application (R011R21) After It Is Received for Peer Review (visited Oct. 6, 1998)
<http'J/www.csr.nih.gov/review/peerrev.htm>. When the study section does not have
the expertise needed to evaluate a particular application, 'the study section's mem-
bership is frequently supplemented by temporary members and written outside opin-
ions." Id.
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. Review Procedures for Initial Review Group Meetings (last modified Aug. 13,
1998) <http:/www.csr.nih.gov/guidelines/proe.htm>. The policy states that "[t]he term
'own organization' includes the entire system in which the member is an employee,
consultant, officer, director, or trustee or has a financial interest; or with which the
member is negotiating or has any arrangement concerning prospective employment."
Id. The policy also states that: "[Ihf the member is available at the principal investi-
gator's institution for discussions; is a provider of services, cell lines, reagents, or
other materials, or writer of a letter of reference, the member must be absent from
the room during the review." Id.
Under the policy, "[members are also urged to avoid any actions that might
give the appearance that a conflict of interest exists, even though he or she believes
there may not be an actual conflict of interest." Id. The policy provides several ex-
amples:
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policy, it is unclear whether the NIH would view freelance ex-
pert witnesses as having conflicts of interest, but employees cer-
tainly would have them. The policy therefore seems to suggest
that the NIH bans input from study section members who have
conflicts, much as NEJM bans editorials by similarly situated
individuals.
The approach of Daubert II to conflicts is thus flawed in two
important ways. First, expert opinions about scientific facts are
not necessarily unreliable simply because they are derived from
research conducted in connection with litigation. Second, unlike
Daubert II, science recognizes that there are a number of cir-
cumstances other than litigation that present conflicts for scien-
tists. In many of these circumstances, scientific institutions have
adopted strict rules forbidding participation by interested scien-
tists. Because this ban on participation is roughly equivalent to
the admissibility decision addressed by the Supreme Court in
Daubert, it may counsel an approach to expert testimony differ-
ent from the one currently used by the courts.
C. Conflicts in the Conduct of the Research About Which the
Expert Testifies
Even if a litigant's selection of an expert was unbiased and
the expert himself had no conflict, the expert's testimony might
still be biased. This is possible because the scientific knowledge
about which the expert testifies may itself be biased. This can
occur in at least three ways. The least difficult of these distor-
tions to detect, perhaps, is the distortion of research results
through control over the reporting of those results. Somewhat
more difficult to detect is a distortion of the record caused by
selective funding. Finally, the most difficult problem is a distor-
tion of research results by researchers themselves.
Thus, for example, a member should not participate in the deliberations
and actions on any application from a recent student, a recent teacher,
or a close personal friend .... Another example might be an application
from a scientist with whom the member has had longstanding differences
which could reasonably be viewed as affecting the member's objectivity.
Another example which might be considered is the review of a project
which closely duplicates work ongoing in the member's laboratory.
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1. Research Reports Distorted by an Interested Party
Not surprisingly, much of the research that is relevant in liti-
gation is conducted or funded by parties to the litigation, or by
sponsors with interests similar to those of parties to the litiga-
tion.115 One problem, discussed below,116 that arises in this con-
text is that the researcher's desire to please her sponsor may
taint the research. The issue considered here is the control that
the sponsor may have over whether the research results-even
assuming that they are unbiased-are made public. A recent
article describes the problem:
Many different types of relationships may exist between
sponsors of research studies and independent investigators. A
sponsored research agreement allows the author to retain
control over the publication of study results. A consulting
agreement may not give explicit publication rights to the in-
vestigator or author. Consulting agreements can also be de-
signed to require the author to submit the manuscript for
publication only after the sponsor reviews the manuscript
and provides written permission for publication. Generally,
sponsored-research agreements are designed to protect the
academic integrity of the study. While the research produced
under these agreements may not appear different to the jour-
nal or to the reader, the sponsorship agreement may serve to
limit the publication of findings that are "negative" from the
sponsor's perspective."7
This problem is illustrated by the recent, well-publicized con-
tract that gave a research sponsor the power to veto publication
by a researcher at the University of California at San Francisco
(UCSF)." 8 A maker of synthetic thyroid hormones had funded
115. See, e.g., Geyelin, Tobacco Papers, supra note 1 (discussing research sponsored
by tobacco companies).
116. See infra notes 155-74 and accompanying text.
117. Kevin Schulman et al., Ethics, Economics, and the Publication Policies of Ma-
jor Medical Journals, 272 JAMA 154, 154 (1994).
118. See Lawrence K. Altman, Drug Firm, Relenting, Allows Unflattering Study to
Appear, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1997, at Al; Ralph T. King, Jr., Bitter Pill: How a
Drug Firm Paid For University Study, Then Undermined It, WALL ST. J., Apr. 25,
1996, at Al; Knoll Agrees to Permit Publication of Drug Study, WALL ST. J., Dec. 9,
1996, at 11F.
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Dr. Betty Dong of UCSF to perform a study comparing its
brand-name thyroid hormone to several other versions of the
same drug.119 The study found that generic forms of the drug
worked just as well as the brand-name form." Dr. Dong had
signed an agreement that gave the drug company control over
publication of her results, however, and Boots Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., which by then had acquired the business of the original
sponsor, refused to give her permission to publish, as did Knoll
Pharmaceutical Company, which later acquired Boots."' Dr.
Dong nevertheless sought to publish the study, and it was ac-
cepted by the Journal of the American Medical Association, but
the university, concerned about financial liability, indicated that
it would not defend her if the company sued. 22 A public outcry
ensued-brought on in part by a Wall Street Journal article re-
garding the incident-and ultimately Knoll allowed the article to
be published two years after its publication was originally sched-
uled." As will be discussed below, Knoll attempted to discredit
Dr. Dong's study both prior to and after the article's publica-
tion.'
The outrage in scientific circles over this incident suggests
that such agreements might be considered "unscientific." Indeed,
the authors of the passage quoted above believe that
"[d]isclosure of these agreements is... critical to the develop-
ment of objective data to aid clinical and health policy decision
making."u 5 They contend that the lack of reporting requirements
suggests "an opportunity for potential manipulation of research
findings by sponsors.""2 Courts that heed the instruction of
119. See King, supra note 118, at Al.
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. See id.
123. See Knoll Agrees to Permit Publication of Drug Study, supra note 118, at 11F.
124. See infra text accompanying notes 277-80.
125. Schulman et al., supra note 117, at 156.
126. Id. Furthermore, the authors of this study suggest problems analogous to
those described above for the !Ldversary system. They claim that "[ilnvestigators who
abide by the principles of requiring academic freedom in sponsorship agreements
may find that they are unable to compete with investigators who do not comply
with these restrictive investigation rules." Id. They further argue that "[s]ince the
journals do not inquire about such arrangements, sponsors and investigators will not
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Daubert to follow scientific standards therefore might consider
disallowing testimony regarding research performed under a
contract that imposes limits on publication.
The same authors note, however, that a survey of leading
medical journals found that although nine of twelve requested
disclosure of the financial arrangements between the authors of
papers and the sponsors of their research, only four inquired
about the author's publication rights, and only one knew wheth-
er the sponsor had the right to prevent or delay publication.'
This might suggest that scientists in fact do not view this as an
important issue.
128
Journal publication is quite different from expert testimony,
though. In publishing an individual study, a journal is concerned
only with the accuracy of that study and not with the accuracy
of the entire scientific record. A journal therefore would not nec-
essarily be concerned that a study would not have been submit-
ted for publication at all if its results had been different.
In contrast, to the extent that parties to litigation will offer
only expert testimony about research the results of which are
favorable to the sponsor that funds it, this will distort the factu-
al record at trial. 129 Research funded by the tobacco industry
may be an example of this practice. Some anecdotal evidence
exists that the tobacco industry has, at least in the past, sought
to influence the publication of research results it funded.'80 Al-
encounter any publication pressure to comply with these standards to maintain the
objectivity of research findings." Id.
127. See id. at 155.
128. See Lawrence K. Altman, Experts See Bias In Drug Data, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29,
1997, at C1 ("[E]xperts said there was little information and few methods to deter-
mine how often information was not reported because of restrictive clauses in con-
tracts. Some said they suspected that other cases similar to Dr. Dong's escape atten-
tion because academic scientists do not seek publication in the first place."). Presum-
ably this means that scientists do not seek publication when they are subject to con-
tractual restrictions.
129. Cf. HUtBER, supra note 9, at 208 (discussing a proposal by physicist Richard
Feynman that a "scientist approached for his expert opinion must resolve at the out-
set to publish or at least disclose his conclusion, regardless of whose side it will
benefit in the forthcoming trial"). Of using a conclusion only when it favors the
sponsor of the work, Feymnan claims: "That's not giving scientific advice.'" Id at
207.
130. See Freddy Homburger, Letter to the Editor, Tobacco Research: One Researcher's
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though this may not be the current policy of the industry,'31 it
might suggest that it would be unwise for courts to allow expert
testimony regarding research funded by the tobacco industry. In
possible support of this view, some scientific institutions, such
as the Massachusetts General Hospital, refuse to accept funding
from the tobacco industry,"2 and some journals do not publish
tobacco-industry-funded research.' 33 The reasons these institu-
Experience, 273 SCIENCE 1322, 1323 (1996). In his letter, Homburger describes an
incident in the early 1970s in which the director of research and lawyer for the
Council for Tobacco Research [CTRI told Homburger that his group "'would never get
another penny from CTR' if we published a paper, submitted for their approval, re-
porting that inhaling cigarette smoke caused laryngeal cancer in a certain inbred
Syrian hamster." Id. The group "never received another penny from CTR" after it
nevertheless published the paper. Id.
The same problem may exist with asbestos research:
Publication [of asbestos research] may be contingent on the words, condi-
tions, and conclusion of a research study, an unfortunate situation that
has apparently persisted in this area of research for over 60 years. In
fact, the authors have been made aware of threatened or actual lawsuits
concerning various publications that have had a chilling effect on the
dissemination of information regarding the possible health effects of as-
bestos.
2 BARBARA J. PETERS & GEORGE A. PETERS, SOURCEBOOK ON ASBE OS DISEASES: MEDICAL,
LEGAL AND ENGINEERING ASPECTS 2 (1986).
131. The author of the letter cited in the previous note states that CTR's more re-
cent policies may be different, see Homburger, supra note 130, at 1322, and an arti-
cle analyzing tobacco industry documents notes that the industry maintains that it
does not restrict publication and cites no documents contradicting that claim. See
Lisa Bero et al., Lawyer Control of the Tobacco Industry's External Research Pro-
gram: The Brown and Williamson Documents, 274 JAMA 241, 244 (1995) (citing,
however, a letter indicating that a funded researcher submitted an article to a to-
bacco company lawyer prior to submitting the article for publication). It is possible
that the tobacco industry distorts the scientific record through its initial decisions on
which research to fund. See infra note 140 and accompanying text.
132. See Jon Cohen, Tobacco Money Lights Up a Debate, 272 SCIENCE 488, 490
(1996). The hospital's policy statement refers to the tobacco industry's citation of
scientists who received industry funding and states that this (presumably misleading)
use of the scientists' names presents a conflict of interest for the hospital. Massachu-
setts Gen. Hosp., Massachusetts General Hospital Policy on Research Support from
the Council for Tobacco Research-U.S.A., Inc. and the Smokeless Tobacco Research
Council, Inc., Mar. 18, 1994, at 2. The citation of the scientist's names might be
seen to have distorted the scientific record in a sense, but the hospital statement
claims that the industry did not "interfer[e] directly with the research programs of
the sponsored investigators." Id.
133. Medical journals published by the American Lung Association (ALA) have re-
fused to publish research funded by the tobacco industry since December 1, 1995.
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tions spurn tobacco industry research are somewhat unclear,"a
however, so their implications in the present context also are
unclear.
2. A Research Record Biased by an Interested Party
A court faces a similar but more difficult problem when a liti-
gant proffers evidence in a situation in which the litigant has
had control over what research has been conducted, as distin-
guished from whether the research done has been reported. 135 In
products liability cases, for example, it is often the case that the
only party with the incentive to pay for research on the product
is the defendant.136 To the extent that the defendant can choose
See American Lung Association, American Lung Association Journals Will Not Pub-
lish Research Funded by Tobacco Industry (press release) (n.d.) (on file with author).
The reasons for the ALA policy are somewhat unclear. The press release issued
when the policy went into effect cited a statement by a past president of the ALA,
Dr. Alfred Munzer, that "the peer review process that screens and evaluates all re-
search that is accepted by [the American Journal of Respiratory and Critical Care
Medicine and the American Journal of Respiratory Cell and Molecular Biology] en-
sures that the studies that are published are accurate and non-biased." Id. at 1-2.
Dr. Munzer nevertheless said that members of the ALAs medical section, the Ameri-
can Thoracic Society (ATS), were concerned about "'even an appearance of conflict."
Id. at 2; see also Arthur C. Caplan, The Smoking Lamp Should Not Be Lit in
ATSIALA Publications, 151 AM. J. RESPIRATORY & CRITICAL CARE MED. 273, 273
(1995) (supporting ATS's then-proposed policy, in part because of the tobacco indus-
try's research policies). It is unclear, however, why readers would think that the
ALA's publication of research funded by the tobacco industry indicated a conflict of
interest. Given the ALA's opposition to smoking, one might expect exactly the oppo-
site: that its refusal to publish such research was the product of bias. Efforts to ob-
tain more information on the ALA's reasons for its policy resulted in repeated, but
unfulfilled, promises to send such information by ATS officials.
134. See supra notes 132-33. Similarly unclear is the justification for the following
recommendation by the National Cancer Advisory Board: "Withdraw Federal funding
from cancer research organizations that accept tobacco industry support." NATIONAL
CANCER ADVISORY BOARD, SUBCOMMITTEE TO EVALUATE THE NATIONAL CANCER PRO-
GRAM, CANCER AT A CROSSROADS: A REPORT TO CONGRESS FOR THE NATION 21
(1994).
135. A recent news article quoted Dr. Alan Garber, Associate Professor of Medicine
at Stanford University, on this point: "There are so many ways to influence what
works get published,'" he said, "'including how a drug company funds research, the
grants they give, whether those writing articles that are favorable to a particular
drug or device get on a speakers list, get honoraria, do consulting.'" Gina Kolata,
Safeguards Urged for Researchers: Aim Is to Keep Vested Interests From Suppressing
Discoveries, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1997, at D23.
136. See SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR: LAW, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY
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to fund research that focuses only on satisfactory aspects of the
product, therefore, it may be able to create a misleading record
for the product. This could happen in at least four different
ways.
First, the defendant could fund, for example, five studies to
examine characteristics of the product for which it expects to
find no problems. When those expectations are confirmed, the
defendant then could offer an expert to testify that five studies
have found the product harmless. These findings would reflect
nothing about the likelihood of harm from some other, unstudied
aspect of the product, but nevertheless might make the product
appear safer to a fact finder. The danger of this approach seems
small, though, because if the studies conducted are not relevant
to the issue in the case, the trial judge should not admit them."3 7
A more serious variation on this problem arises when scien-
tists who are considering undertaking research that might dis-
cover problems are deterred from doing so by interested parties.
In a recent article, a scientist reported that after he published
research indicating that calcium channel blockers--drugs used
to lower blood pressure-were associated with an increased risk
of heart attacks, he was harassed by one of the manufacturers of
the drugs and by academic consultants to the manufacturers. 8'
A commentator observed that "experiences like those... 'could
hinder an investigator's choice of what to study.'"'3 9
A third possibility presents more of a problem. The defendant
might fund studies that are relevant to the issue in the case, but
that are designed to be unlikely to detect a problem, even if one
exists. Some researchers believe that this is a practice in which
the tobacco industry engages,' 40 and an example of this strategy
(1995) ("Often research is undertaken only when a lawsuit points to the existence of
a previously unsuspected causal connection, such as electromagnetic fields and cancer
or silicone gel breast implants and immune system disorders.").
137. See FED. R. EVID. 402.
138. See Richard A. Deyo et -al., The Messenger Under Attack-Intimidation of Re-
searchers by Special-Interest Groups, 336 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1176, 1177 (1997).
139. Kolata, supra note 135, at D23 (quoting Dr. Suzanne Fletcher, Professor of
Ambulatory Care and Prevention at Harvard Medical School).
140. See Henriques, supra note 1; Homburger, supra note 130 ("[S]tudies implicat-
ing cigarette smoke as a health hazard have not been getting support from CTR
[the industry-funded Council for Tobacco Research] or are limited to projects with
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arguably occurred in In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Products Lia-
bility Litigation.141 In that case, manufacturers of bone screws,
together with orthopedic surgeons and professional societies,
conducted a study to evaluate the use of the screws for non-
FDA-approved purposes. 42 The screws were being used widely
for these alternative purposes, and the manufacturers intended
the study to evaluate the safety of such use.' The surgeons
asked to conduct the study had used the screws, and they were
told that the study might lead to FDA approval for the new
use.'" The plaintiffs argued to exclude the study as biased "be-
cause the surgeons who participated in [the study] did so as sup-
porters of pedicle screw fixation in response to the announce-
ment that the study was expected to determine that pedicle
screw fixation was safe and effective and therefore lead to FDA
approval."'45 The court held, however, that this was only a po-
tential source of bias, not a proven one, and it did not "prevent
the study from crossing the reliability threshold of Rule 702."'
46
This seems to be an incorrect result. The issue under Daubert
is one of reliability, and bias can suggest that a study is unreli-
able without proving that it is invalid. If a litigant had to prove
the effects of bias, no evidence would ever be excluded on that
ground: courts would exclude studies in which bias was proven
not because they were biased, but because they were false. In
the pedicle-screw litigation, therefore, if the plaintiffs had shown
a source of bias in the selection of study participants, the study
would have been rendered less reliable, and it at least should
have been subject to some form of judicial scrutiny. For example,
the court could have required the defendants to show that scien-
tific journals would not have believed that the bias was suffi-
predictably negative outcome, such as having mice inhale cigarette smoke that kills
them because of their sensitivity to nicotine before carcinogenic doses are reached.").
141. MDL Docket No. 1014, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6441 (E.D. Pa. May 5, 1997).
142. See id. at *1-*2.
143. See id. at *2, *5.
144. See id. at *3.
145. Id. at *14.
146. Id. at *22. The plaintiffs also argued that the study was rendered less reliable
by "the failure by the doctors to report their financial interests," but the court held
that this was a factor bearing on the weight, not the admissibility, of the testimony.
Id. at *13 n.7.
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cient to disqualify the study. Only then, perhaps, should it have
been admissible.
Finally, a defendant might influence the research record by
funding no research. In a recent article, Professor Wendy Wag-
ner pointed out that "[a] manufacturer that conducts no research
can generally avoid liability because plaintiffs and government
research programs are unlikely to conduct scientific research on
their own."' She argues that, because research always presents
the possibility of discovering evidence of a risk associated with
the manufacturer's product, conducting research stands to in-
crease the liability of the manufacturer.' Professor Wagner ar-
gues that much of the resulting scientific uncertainty is prevent-
able 49 and that public programs, such as the National Toxicolo-
gy Program, the federal program that tests chemicals for toxicity
and carcinogenicity, 5 ° are not sufficient to prevent it.
151
To a large extent, of course, this issue is simply one concern-
ing the placement of the burden of proof. As Professor Wagner
argues, it might suggest that the burden would be better placed,
at least to some extent, on the defendant. 152 Even in the absence
of such a shift, though, her point may have implications for evi-
dentiary admissibility in light of Daubert's direction to use sci-
entific standards in the admissibility decision. Although some
courts might be willing to-admit expert testimony that draws a
conclusion of no causation from the absence of sufficient proof of
causation, it might not be scientifically legitimate to do so in the
absence of any study of the matter.15 In other words, if, in the
147. Wendy E. Wagner, Choosing Ignorance in the Manufacture of Toxic Products,
82 CORNELL L. REV. 773, 775 (1997) (citation omitted). Wagner also notes that "vic-
tims are able to challenge the adequacy of a manufacturer's safety and design deci-
sions only in the small percentage of cases where a substantial body of scientific
studies exists." Id. at 794. See also Rebecca S. Dresser et al., Breast Implants Revis-
ited: Beyond Science on Trial, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 705 (noting manufacturers' failure
to perform product safety research as a means of avoiding liability).
148. See Wagner, supra note 147, at 794.
149. See id. at 780-83.
150. See National Toxicology Program (visited Oct. 7, 1998) <http'/ntp-server.
niehs.nih.gov/main-pages/aboutNTP.html>.
151. See Wagner, supra note 147, at 785-86 & 801 n.99.
152. See id. at 833-52; see also Dresser et al., supra note 147, at 775-76.
153. This issue is, of course, different from the issue of whether one can draw a
conclusion of no causation from one or more studies that investigate the issue and
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absence of any study, scientists would be unwilling to say any
more than that no studies had been conducted, perhaps courts
should not allow expert witnesses to say more.15
find no evidence of causation. See, e.g., FOSTER & HuBER, supra note 4, at 131-34.
154. Foster and Huber make this point:
Ignorance is never relevant in a trial, and therefore never admissi-
ble-least of all when it is affirmed by an "expert" who is supposed to
testify exclusively about "scientific knowledge." Unadorned statements
about ignorance are inadmissible because they are irrelevant. They don't
tend to prove one side of the case or the other. Legally speaking, they
are just superfluous fluff.
Id. at 220-21.
Some courts have come quite close to admitting this sort of statement. Consider,
for example, Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 902 F.2d 362 (5th Cir. 1990). The
plaintiff's decedent died of small-cell carcinoma of the colon, and the plaintiff
claimed that the cancer was caused by his exposure, while working for the defen-
dant, to nickel and cadmium fumes. See id. at 363-64. The plaintiff's expert proposed
to testify that small-cell carcinoma in the lung had been associated with nickel and
cadmium exposure and that, "based on what's known about the biochemical nature
of small-cell' carcinoma," it was likely that such carcinomas in other areas of the
body also would be associated with such exposures. Id. at 366 (quoting expert's de-
position testimony). One of the defendant's experts testified that this conclusion was
"'without basis in fact and ha[d] no scientific merit,'" apparently relying on the fact
that the lung and colon tumors had "'never been shown to have a common causation
or share a proven common origin.'" Id. (quoting expert's affidavit).
The district court excluded the testimony of the plaintiffs expert, but the court
of appeals stated that this created a conflict between the experts, and that the dis-
trict court inappropriately "chose sides" between them. Id. It is not clear, though,
that the district court's choosing between the experts was the real problem: if the
defendant's expert was testifying on the basis of a lack of studies showing causation,
his testimony should not have been admitted at all, because there would have been
no factual basis for his testimony. He should only have been able to testify to flaws
in the analysis of the plaintiffs expert, or to the existence of studies that did not
show causation but that would have done so if there was in fact a causal relation-
ship. On rehearing en banc, the majority of the court of appeals sided with the
district court, but on a more acceptable theory-that the testimony of the defen-
dant's expert was that the plaintiffs expert merely had a "hunch" and that he re-
jectea his methodology. See Christopherson v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106,
1115 & n.16 (5th Cir. 1991) (en banc); cf. Peterson v. Sealed Air Corp., Nos. 86-
C3498, 88-C9859, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5333, at *14-*17 (N.D. IM. Apr. 23, 1991)
(discussing the testimony of three of defendant's experts, one of whom noted the
lack of any studies supporting the plaintiffs theory, of causation, but could not testi-
fy that no causal relationship existed; a second who testified, based on the lack of
evidence supporting the plaintiffs theory, together with some apparently anecdotal
evidence, that no causal relationship existed; and another who testified that other
studies would have shown the causal relationship had it existed).
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Even if one were unwilling to go this far, this source of bias
might suggest a need for more tolerance of weaknesses in plain-
tiffs' evidence when defendants have conducted no studies them-
selves. A plaintiff in such a situation is left to do the best it can,
often with limited control over the experimental conditions un-
der which the defendant's action or product can be tested. In
those circumstances, a plaintiff might not be able to produce a
study that meets usual scientific standards. In some cases, the
court nevertheless should admit plaintiffs work if the defendant
could have produced a valid study itself, but chose not to.
3. Research Biased by Researchers
The final possibility is that research will be biased not by its
sponsors, but by the researchers themselves. As Daubert II sug-
gests, this possibility is perhaps most obvious when the research
is conducted in connection with litigation and the researcher
presumably knows the result that the client seeks.'55 Research-
ers also may have incentives to reach particular results in other
contexts, though, as when their research is funded by a sponsor
from whom the researcher might reasonably expect future sup-
port. In response, a variety of scientific institutions have adopt-
ed procedures to address researchers' conflicts of interest.
The recently adopted policy of the Food and Drug Administra-
tion (FDA) is typical of several similar agency regulations.'56 The
FDA regulations "require an applicant whose submission relies
in part on clinical data to disclose certain financial arrange-
ments between sponsor(s) of the covered studies and the clinical
investigators and certain interests of the clinical investigators in
the product under study or in the sponsor of the covered stud-
ies" 57 The regulations cover a range of these financial arrangements. 15
155. See PETERS & PETERS, supra note 130, at 2 ("In some cases, the source of re-
search funds may, directly or indirectly, hopefully anticipate a 'favorable' outcome,
and if this does not come to pass, the displeasure may result in an absence of funds
for future investigations.").
156. See Financial Disclosure by Clinical Investigators, 63 Fed. Reg. 5233 (1998) (to
be codified in scattered sections of 21 C.F.R.). The policies of the Public Health Ser-
vice (PHS) and National Science Foundation (NSF) are similar. See Responsibility of
Applicants for Promoting Objectivity in Research for Which PHS Funding is Sought,
42 C.F.R. §§ 50.601 to .606 (1997).
157. Financial Disclosure by Clinical Investigators, 21 C.F.R. § 54.1(b) (1998). The
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As a preliminary matter, one might ask whether these regula-
tions represent the views of scientists themselves or are simply
imposed on scientists by federal agencies. Only in the former
case, of course, would they be relevant under Daubert. The agen-
cies point out, though, that the regulations are at least in part a
response to a perceived need in the scientific community. 159 In
addition, the specific recommendations of the agencies are con-
PHS regulations are similar, requiring institutions that receive research funding
from PHS sources like the NIH to "identify conflicting interests," but they also re-
quire those institutions to "take such actions as necessary to ensure that such con-
flicting interests will be managed, reduced, or eliminated." 42 C.F.R. § 50.604(d).
158. The FDA rule requires disclosure of
(i) Any financial arrangement entered into between the sponsor of
the covered study and the clinical investigator involved in the conduct of
a covered clinical trial, whereby the value of the compensation to the
clinical investigator for conducting the study could be influenced by the
outcome of the study;
(ii) Any significant payments of other sorts from the sponsor of the
covered study, such as a grant to fund ongoing research, compensation in
the form of equipment, retainer for ongoing consultation, or honoraria;
(iii) Any proprietary interest in the tested product held by any clini-
cal investigator involved in a study;
(iv) Any significant equity interest in the sponsor of the covered
study held by any clinical investigator involved in any clinical study; and
(v) Any steps taken to minimize the potential for bias resulting from
any of the disclosed arrangements, interests, or payments.
21 C.F.R. § 54.4(a)(3). The rule states that
[clompensation affected by the outcome of clinical studies means compen-
sation that could be higher for a favorable outcome than for an unfavor-
able outcome, such as compensation that is explicitly greater for a favor-
able result or compensation to the investigator in the form of an equity
interest in the sponsor of a covered study or in the form of compensation
tied to sales of the product, such as a royalty interest.
21 C.F.R. § 54.2(a).
Again, the PHS regulations are similar, focusing on what they call "Significant
Financial Interests," which are defined as "anything of monetary value, including but
not limited to, salary or other payments for services (e.g., consulting fees or honorar-
ia); equity interests (e.g., stocks, stock options, or other ownership interests); and in-
tellectual property rights (e.g., patents, copyrights, and royalties from such rights)."
42 C.F.R. § 50.603.
159. See Financial Disclosure by Clinical Investigators, 59 Fed. Reg. 48,708, 48,708
(1994) (to be codified in scattered parts of 21 C.F.R.) (proposed Sept. 22, 1994)
("There is a growing recognition in the academic and scientific communities that cer-
tain financial arrangements between clinical investigators and product sponsors, or
the personal financial interests of clinical investigators, can potentially bias the out-
come of clinical trials.").
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sistent with, though more formal than, those proposed by scien-
tists themselves. 6 ' For example, the agencies' recommendations
are very similar to those proposed by the Association of Ameri-
can Medical Colleges. 6'
Applying these policies to research that is the subject of ex-
pert testimony nevertheless is not straightforward. The first
question that one would need to ask is whether, as the Public
Health Service (PHS) puts it, the source of the research funding
"could directly and significantly [have] affect[ed] [its] design,
conduct, or reporting.""6 2 One might argue that this criterion
would not apply to employees of interested parties, because their
compensation and continued employment is not explicitly contin-
gent on the results of their research, and their employment sta-
tus therefore is unlikely to "significantly affect" the research.
Even though their continued employment may not be explicitly
contingent on the results achieved, though, employees are still
likely to feel pressure that might skew their research. The FDA
has recognized this in its policy. Although the FDA policy gener-
ally focuses on financial interests that are more explicitly contin-
gent than those of employees,' it does not exclude employees
160. See Objectivity in Research, 59 Fed. Reg. 33,242, 33,246 (1994) (to be codified
in 42 C.F.R. pt. 50 and 45 C.F.R. pt. 94) (proposed June 28, 1994) ("Such manage-
ment methods are common in the-sciences ... ."); Michael D. Witt & Lawrence 0.
Gostin, Conflict of Interest Dilemmas in Biomedical Research, 271 JAMA 547, 550
(1994) ("Investigators who have material interests (including equity, royalty incen-
tives, and ongoing sponsored research activities) in a for-profit corporation licensing
a product from their research institute warrant careful scrutiny.").
161. In the conflicts of interest guidelines adopted by the Executive Council of the
Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC) on February 22, 1990, the AAMC
lists the following "Situations That May Impart Bias in Research":
•Undertaking basic or clinical research when the investigator or the
investigator's immediate family has a financial, managerial, or ownership
interest in the sponsoring company or in the company producing the
drug/device under evaluation
-Accepting gratuities or special favors from research sponsors
-Entering into a consultantship arrangement with an organization or
individual having an economic interest in related research
AAMC, Guidelines for Dealing with Faculty Conflicts of Commitment and Conflicts of
Interest in Research (visited Oct. 5, 1998) <http'l/www.aamc.orgresearch/dbr/coi.
htm#interest> [hereinafter AAMC, Guidelines for Dealing with Faculty Conflicts].
162. 42 C.F.R. § 50.605(a)(1997).
163. See generally Financial Disclosure by Clinical Investigators, 63 Fed. Reg. 5,233,
1357
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:1313
from scrutiny. On the contrary, the FDA "treats data from clini-
cal investigators who are the employees of sponsors with maxi-
mum scrutiny and will continue to do so because such employees
can be assumed to have significant financial interests in the out-
come of studies. ""'
Moving beyond employees, it may be more difficult to deter-
mine whether a particular researcher has a conflict. Some non-
employment relationships will present straightforward conflicts
of interest, of course. The FDA policy cited above lists contingent
payment arrangements and proprietary and equity interests
among these problematic relationships.'65 The implications of
other relationships, such as intermittent consulting arrange-
ments, are less clear. This lack of clarity was exactly the prob-
lem in the dispute discussed above involving editorialists in the
166New England Journal of Medicine, and one can easily imagine
other, similarly borderline relationships. When such relation-
ships are involved, it is necessary to determine, as the FDA re-
quires, whether they are "significant" enough to create conflicts.
A more fundamental problem is that none of the agency regu-
lations specify what action they will take in case of a conflict.
The FDA rule is typical in providing a list of possible actions:
(1) Initiating agency audits of the data derived from the
clinical investigator in question;
(2) Requesting that the applicant submit further analyses
of data, e.g., to evaluate the effect of the clinical investiga-
tor's data on overall study outcome;
(3) Requesting that the applicant conduct additional inde-
pendent studies to confirm the results of the questioned
study; and
(4) Refusing to treat the covered clinical study as providing
data that can be the basis for an agency action.
167
5,233 (1998) (to be codified in scattered parts of 21 C.F.R.) (requiring disclosure of
"financial interests of and arrangements of clinical investigators that could affect
reliability of data submitted to FDA in support of product marketing").
164. Id. at 5240.
165. See Financial Disclosure by Clinical Investigators, 21 C.F.R. § 54.4(a)(3) (1998).
166. See supra text accompanying notes 45-51.
167. Financial Disclosure by Clinical Investigators, 21 C.F.R. § 54.5(c). The reme-
dies other agencies provide are similar. For example, the PHS policy states that pos-
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Because the rule does not describe in which circumstances the
FDA would apply each of these actions-the regulations state
only that the agency "may consider both the size and nature of a
disclosed financial interest.., and steps that have been taken
to minimize the potential for bias"' 6 --it is difficult to draw from
them much in the way of guidance for expert testimony.
Importantly, though, each of the actions appears to involve
more than the rough scientific equivalent of cross-examination.
The fourth option, that of refusing to treat the study as a basis
for FDA action, is roughly equivalent to a court holding testimo-
ny inadmissible. The second and third options of requiring more
confirmatory information are perhaps similar to holding testimo-
ny insufficient to overcome a motion for summary judgment. The
first option, that of reviewing the original data on which the
study is based, is closest to cross-examination, except that the
sible actions "include, but are not limited to," the following:
(1) Public disclosure of significant financial interests;
(2) Monitoring of research by independent reviewers;
(3) Modification of the research plan;
(4) Disqualification from participation in all or a portion of the research
funded by the PHS;
(5) Divestiture of significant financial interests; or
(6) Severance of relationships that create actual or potential conflicts.
42 C.F.R. § 50.605(a) (1997).
The 1990 AAMC conflict of interest guidelines state that:
[p]ossible options include, but are not limited to:
* Public disclosure of all relevant information,
* Reformulation of the research workplan,
* Close monitoring of the research project,
* Divestiture of relevant personal interests,
* Termination or reduction of involvement in the relevant research pro-
ject,
* Termination of inappropriate student involvement in projects, and
* Severance of outside relationships that pose conflicts.
AAMC, Guidelines for Dealing with Faculty Conflicts, supra note 161. The NSF cited
the AAMC guidelines, along with those of the Association of American Universities,
as useful "[g]uidance" in its conflicts policy. Investigator Financial Disclosure Policy,
59 Fed. Reg. 33,308, at 33,311 & n.1 (1994) (citing, e.g., ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN
MEDICAL COLLEGES, GUIDELINES FOR DEALING WITH FACULTY CONFLICTS OF CoMMrr-
MENT AND CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN RESEARCH (1990); ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN
UNIVERSITIES, FRAMEWORK DOCUMIENT FOR MANAGING FINANCIAL CONFLICTS OF IN-
TEREST (1993)).
168. 21 C.F.R. § 54.5(a).
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original data supporting scientific expert witness testimony is
often not available to the opposing party in litigation.
The FDA rule therefore suggests that scientists 69 find simple
disclosure of conflicts of interest an insufficient remedy when
some decision turns on the results of research.'70 If the courts
were to take seriously the deference to science counseled by
Daubert, they would take a more strict approach than allowing
mere cross-examination regarding conflicts in research about
which an expert witness testifies. This is especially so in that
jurors often will not have the FDA's expertise in evaluating pos-
sible flaws in the research.' Indeed, the FDA initially consid-
ered simple public disclosure of the information about conflicts
that they received, but it met a number of objections, some argu-
ing that "the public would not be in a position to interpret this
information properly,"'72 and it decided instead to resolve disclo-
sure issues on a case-by-case basis.' 3
Finally, the source of funding for a study about which a scien-
tific expert witness proposes to testify may not always be clear.
If no such information is available, should the testimony never-
theless be permitted? The FDA states in its rule that "[it] may
refuse to file any marketing application.., that does not con-
tain the [conflict of interest] information required ... or a certif-
169. As pointed out above, scientists have recognized the need for policies similar
to those of the FDA (as well as the PHS and the NSF), and scientific institutions
themselves have adopted such policies. See supra notes 161 & 167 and accompanying
text.
170. This claim is not contrary to the observations above that scientific journals
generally are content with authors' disclosure of financial interests and often do not
transmit those disclosures to their readers. See supra text accompanying note 106.
Articles in scientific journals usually are not intended to prompt immediate action;
when, as with editorials and review articles, action is expected to turn on the jour-
nals' publications, their policies can be more strict. See supra text accompanying
notes 107-09. With expert testimony, as with FDA submissions, actions turn on the
research results.
171. In a similar context, involving patients rather than jurors, two writers have
suggested that disclosure may be an inadequate remedy, because "those who receive
the information, especially patients, may not know how to evaluate it." Ezekiel J.
Emanuel & Daniel Steiner, Institutional Conflict of Interest, 332 NEw ENG. J. MED.
262, 265 (1995).
172. Financial Disclosure by Clinical Investigators, 63 Fed. Reg. 5233, 5237 (to be
codified in scattered parts of 21 C.F.R.) (1998).
173. See id.
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ication by the applicant that the applicant has acted with due
diligence to obtain the information but was unable to do so and
stating the reason."174 This suggests that, at a minimum, courts
should require expert witnesses to disclose conflicts of interest of
the scientists who conducted the research about which they tes-
tify, or a certification similar to that required by the FDA. Only
then will courts be able to assess the significance of the conflicts.
IH. LEGAL AND SCIENTIFIC STANDARDS FOR CONFLICTS
Part I of this Article suggested that Daubert's rationale for
deferring to science in determining the proper legal treatment of
scientific evidence also may apply to conflicts of interest, and
Part II showed that the lower courts have not taken this ap-
proach. One therefore faces two alternatives. If Daubert's defer-
ence to science also should apply to conflicts, one could conclude
that the lower courts are wrong, and that they should adhere to
scientific standards in handling the conflicts of interest of scien-
tific experts. Part II suggested, in a general way, what this
might entail. Alternatively, one could conclude that Daubert's
deference to science is inappropriate in the conflicts context and
that law should not defer to science, or should defer only partial-
ly, in assessing the significance of conflicts of interest. The goals
and methods of law may differ sufficiently from those of science
to require a different approach to conflicts..
A. The Importance of Context in Addressing Conflicts of Interest
Deference to science in evaluating conflicts of interest in ex-
pert testimony does not seem to be the proper approach. Expert
testimony is at issue in legal contexts that are, for the most
part, quite different from those of science. Law must be con-
cerned with conflicts that will distort an individual decision. Sci-
ence is less concerned with conflicts that will affect an individu-
al decision than with those that will cause systematic distortions
of the scientific record. One therefore would expect science to be
most concerned with conflicts that affect the research process,
174. 21 C.F.R. § 54.4(c) (1998).
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and with those that would persist over a series of research pro-
jects.
This analysis is generally borne out by the above discussion.
The lack of concern in science about conflicts in individual in-
stances is reflected in the failure of many scientific journals even
to ask their authors about financial interests they may have in
the articles they submit.175 The rationale for this approach pre-
sumably is that errors caused by these conflicts will not persist
in light of efforts to repeat the research. When the potential for
systematic distortion of the research record exists, however, as
with research funded by the tobacco industry, scientific insti-
tutions have acted to prevent that distortion.
176
There are some instances in which science shows concern re-
garding possible bias in individual statements. Such concern is
exhibited, for example, in the New England Journal of Medi-
cine's ban on editorials and review articles by interested par-
ties, 77 the NIH's efforts to avoid conflicts in its funding deci-
sions, 78 and the FDA's policy regarding drug approval applica-
tions. 79 The common feature in all of these instances, however,
is the obvious effect that the individual scientific decision will
have on financial interests, which takes them out of the realm of
pure science.
Moreover, in an important sense these circumstances also
could be viewed as not quite "scientific." The NIH and FDA poli-
cies both apply in the context of federal government
decisionmaking-funding in the former case, regulatory approval
in the latter-so they could be said to fall more in the realm of
policy than of science. Editorials and, to a lesser extent, review
articles generally assess the current state of scientific knowledge
when it is somewhat uncertain. Although science often simply
postpones decisions in such circumstances, postponing the deci-
175. See Kevin Schulman et al., Ethics, Economics, and the Publication Policies of
Major Medical Journals, 272 JAMA 154, 155 (1994); cf supra text accompanying
notes 106-07 (discussing journals' failures to disclose conflicts to their readers).
176. See Alan Blum & Howard Wolinsky, AMA Rewrites Tobacco History, 346 LAN-
CET 261, 261 (1995); supra notes 130-34 and accompanying text.
177. See Angell & Kassirer, supra note 47, at 1055.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 111-14.
179. See Financial Disclosure by Clinical Investigators, 63 Fed. Reg. 5233, 5238 (to
be codified in scattered parts of 21 C.F.R.) (1998).
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sion is not an option when, for example, doctors must make
medical treatment decisions. In these cases, then, the medical
needs of patients, rather than the scientific search for knowl-
edge, drive the need for a decision. Thus, when financial, legal,
or medical issues are at stake, science adopts a more careful ap-
proach to conflicts than it does in other, more purely scientific
circumstances. Because analogous financial and legal issues are
at stake in litigation, one would expect science to adopt a simi-
larly careful approach to conflicts in that context.
Even the more careful approach that science sometimes takes
to conflicts may not be especially applicable to litigation, though.
Conflicts policies may need to be more specifically tailored to
particular contexts, even in these conflict-conscious areas. This
can be seen in the FDA's response to comments stating that it
should conform its conflict of interest policy to the policy of the
Public Health Service (PHS). The FDA pointed out that it was
concerned with "ensur[ing] data integrity for the purposes of
product review," whereas the PHS was concerned with grant
making and "the credibility of the scientific enterprise. " ° If the
objectives of the FDA and the PHS differ sufficiently to require
distinct conflict of interest rules, the objectives of litigation cer-
tainly require different rules from either, and different rules
from other scientific contexts.
B. How Do Conflicts in Litigation Differ from Conflicts in
Science?
To decide how the treatment of conflicts of interest in litiga-
tion should differ from their treatment in science, one must ex-
amine how the two contexts differ. The previous section dis-
cussed the most fundamental difference: law is concerned with
reaching correct individual decisions, whereas science, or at
least the scientific journal, is concerned with the overall scientif-
ic record. This difference, though real, is of little value in deter-
mining how to deal with particular conflicts because it describes
the respective goals of law and science, not their fact finding ap-
proaches. One can, however, find guidance as to the proper ap-
180. Id.
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proach to conflicts in each discipline in their approaches to fact
finding.
Broadly speaking, two types of differences exist in the fact
finding of law and science. First, there are important differences
in the methods the two disciplines use in fact finding. The basic
difference is that between the examination and cross-examina-
tion of the legal adversarial system, and scientific peer review.
Cross-examination can be very effective at uncovering more or
less obvious flaws in testimony, whereas peer review for journal
publication can let even very significant errors slip through. 81
This suggests that the law could be more tolerant of bias in
testimony than in the underlying research. Because testimonial
bias is more likely to be detected and neutralized, it is less likely
to be a serious problem.
On the issue of bias in the underlying research that is the
subject of the testimony, however, the situation is reversed. The
scientific process of attempted replication is certain in the end to
detect any flaws in previous research. In a particular case,
though, the law does not have the benefit of this process. More-
over, cross-examination often will be an ineffective means of ex-
posing these sorts of flaws, both because such flaws may be re-
flected in subtle choices the implications of which are difficult to
expose on cross-examination and because trial judges may be
unwilling to allow attorneys to delve deeply into the content of
research, particularly if the witness is not the one who conduct-
ed the research.
Therefore, in focusing its admissibility decision on the con-
flicts of witnesses, rather than on the conflicts of researchers,
Daubert II may have it backward. As described above, the ap-
proach of Daubert H reflects skepticism regarding the testimony
of witnesses who have not themselves performed the relevant re-
search-that is, reflects skepticism regarding witnesses qua wit-
nesses-but makes no effort to address conflicts in the underly-
ing research, which in fact may be a greater problem. Cross-ex-
amination is likely to be a more effective means of addressing
conflicts of witnesses than conflicts of researchers. Even if those
181. See FOSTER & HUBER, supra note 4, at 171-75, 180.
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researchers are themselves on the stand, therefore, Daubert Iis
approach seems inappropriate.
The second important difference in the fact finding of law and*
science is that, as described in the previous section, law often
must reach a final conclusion in cases in which information is
lacking, whereas science usually need not make decisions before
information is complete. I82 It is somewhat unclear how uncer-
tainty in legal fact finding should affect the treatment of con-
flicts. Here, the emphasis of Daubert II on witness conflicts
rather than researcher conflicts may be more appropriate. The
selection of the expert to testify is particularly important when
little actual research is available to constrain the expert's state-
ments. When there is much research available, an expert is con-
strained by that research, and the expert's pre-existing biases
are less important. But this effect may be countered by another:
witnesses who have performed some of the (little) research avail-
able-that is, those witnesses that Daubert II would favor-may
be biased. In fact, witnesses who have done the only research
available might present special problems, combining the normal
difficulty that all researchers, indeed all people, have in seeing
flaws in their own work with the absence of other work with
which to compare it.
183
This is not to say, of course, that newcomers to the relevant
issues present no problems. The problems, however, are less
likely to be scientific than purely venal. As discussed above,
182. See JASANOFF, supra note 136, at 9; see also J.M. ZIMAN, PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE:
AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE SOCIAL DIMENSION OF SCIENCE 14-15 (1968). Ziman
makes exactly this point:
[Of] course, in Science, when the evidence is conflicting, we withhold our
assent or dissent, and do the experiment again. This cannot be done in
legal disputes, which must be terminated yea or nay....
The Law is thus unscientific because it must decide upon matters
which are not at all amenable to a consensus of opinion.
Id.
183. In other words, Daubert Irs point that "there is usually a limited number of
scientists actively conducting research on the very subject that is germane to a par-
ticular case," Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir.
1995), is a two-edged sword. It is true that, as the court in Daubert II wrote, this
"provides a natural constraint on parties' ability to shop for experts who will come
to the desired conclusion," id., but it also is true that many or all of the (few) scien-
tists working on a particular question may share the same biases.
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many "experts" seem to do no scientific work at all,"' relying
instead on their work as witnesses for their livelihood. Conse-
quently, the better question to ask may be not whether their
scientific work is biased, or whether their legal work is scientif-
ic, but whether they are acting as scientists at all.
IV. AN APPROACH TO INCORPORATING SCIENTIFIC STANDARDS IN
ADMISSIBILITY DECISIONS
The preceding sections suggest an approach to conflicts that
differs both from the current approach of lower courts, as repre-
sented in decisions such as Daubert II, and from the deference to
science underlying Daubert, yet draws from each. Daubert I em-
phasizes the conflicts of interest that can be present when sci-
ence is performed or used in connection with litigation. The
approach proposed here follows Daubert II in focusing on con-
flicts but recognizes the broader set of circumstances that can
bias the research record. The approach proposed here also fol-
lows Daubert in looking to the methods of science, but it recog-
nizes that conflicts of interest present special problems in litiga-
tion, both in themselves and as they affect the Daubert admissi-
bility factors.
A. Separating the Witness from the Researcher
Although the Ninth Circuit in Daubert II seemed to assume
that the testimony of a scientific expert witness always concerns
the witness's own research, that is not the case. An expert often
testifies regarding research performed by others. This sometimes
happens directly, as when an expert presents another research-
er's work, but it also can happen indirectly, as when an expert
presents her own analysis drawing on other work. In either situ-
ation, the witness's testimony can be skewed either by her own
conflicts of interest or by those of the researchers whose work
forms part of her testimony. It is therefore appropriate, where
possible, to separate the analyses of the conflicts of witnesses
and researchers. This section will consider how these separate
analyses should be performed; the next section will consider how
184. See supra text accompanying notes 59-61.
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to analyze the implications of conflicts of interest for one who is
both witness and researcher.
1. The Expert Witness Testifying About the Research of Others
The Party Witness. As described earlier, conflicts in testimony
are less troubling than conflicts in the research underlying testi-
mony because testimonial conflicts are easier for fact finders to
appreciate and to incorporate in the decisionmaking process. 85
This suggests that when a witness is testifying about the re-
search of others, the fact finder should consider the conflicts of
the witness qua witness in determining the weight to give his
testimony and that the judge generally should not exclude testi-
mony on the basis of those conflicts. This is especially so in that,
when the witness presenting the research has not herself per-
formed it, the opposing party is at no disadvantage in analyzing
and presenting an opposing view of that research. There are
certain circumstances, however, in which bias might appropri-
ately factor into an admissibility decision. 8 6
185. See supra text accompanying note 181.
186. The witness-oriented approach proposed here is somewhat similar to, though
differently directed than, Professor Margaret Berger's Evidentiary Framework, pub-
lished in the Federal Judicial Center's Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence. See
Berger, supra note 21. Professor Berger recommends a two-pronged approach to
evaluating an expert's education and qualifications under Rule 702, the first prong
focusing on the expert's basic qualifications and the second on whether "the expert's
particular expertise, however acquired, enables the expert to give an opinion that is
capable of assisting the trier of fact." Id. at 55. Although her focus is primarily on
whether the expert's particular field of expertise is appropriate for the relevant ques-
tion at trial, she also discusses concerns about the "professional witness" that are
related to the issues here.
Even if research is properly "scientific," it might not be appropriately introduced
in court. As Judge Barbara Crabb has noted, the Supreme Court in Daubert "did not
suggest that [scientifically accepted] methods would be the sole means of challenging
a theory or a study. " Barbara B. Crabb, Judicially Compelled Disclosure of
Researchers' Data: A Judge's View, LAW & CONTEMIP PROBS., Summer 1996, at 9, 14.
The Supreme Court in Daubert addressed not only the Rule 702 requirement that a
scientific expert witness testify to "scientific knowledge" but also the requirement
that the testimony "assist the trier of fact." See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms.,
Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993). This latter requirement, the Court said, "goes pri-
marily to relevance," i.e., to whether the proffered scientific evidence "properly can
be applied to the facts in issue." Id. at 591, 593. Although commentators generally
have read the word "primarily" out of the Court's statements, one could interpret
Daubert to require, or at least to permit trial courts to require, more than mere
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As pointed out above, a witness's bias can be very important,
perhaps even outcome-determinative, in cases in which the sci-
entific evidence is scant."8 7 Courts cannot, of course, adopt a
special rule for such cases-there is only one Rule 702-but the
nature of the witnesses that often appear in these cases suggests
an alternative approach. Specifically, in cases in which science is
inconclusive, the witnesses often are individuals who spend little
time conducting research in a scientific context and a great deal
of time doing "science" in a litigation context.'88 Yet it is precise-
ly when the science is inconclusive that a witness's familiarity
with and conformity to the practices of science are most impor-
tant.
Therefore, disqualification of a witness might be appropriate
when (1) the case is one in which there is little relevant research
available, and (2) the witness is one who spends little time doing
research outside the litigation context.1 89 As a commentator re-
cently put it, an "expert's strength as a witness depends on her
experience." 9 ° This commentator pointed out that the role of ex-
perience is critical in cases in which the data is inconclusive:
relevance; specifically, it could require that proffered testimony, even if formally sci-
entific, be sufficiently objective to be suited to a legal fact finding role (as distin-.
guished from a scientific role).
187. See supra text accompanying notes 182-83.
188. See JASANOFF, supra note 136, at 131-34 (discussing testimony of clinical ecolo-
gists and the lack of scientific evidence for their testimony).
189. That is, the witness would be excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 as
not "qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education."
See supra note 18. Such disqualification would not entirely avoid the problem of ap-
plying Rule 702 differently in different cases, but the different application can be
justified on the view that what (or who) "will assist the trier of fact" in one case
may not do so in another.
190. Christopher P. Murphy, Note, Experts, Liars, and Guns for Hire: A Different
Perspective on the Qualifications of Technical Expert Witnesses, 69 IND. L.J. 637, 651
(1994). Mr. Murphy was writing about engineer experts, but the same principles
apply to scientific experts. A somewhat similar, but more general, point was made
by Professor Gross in his article on experts:
Unfortunately, this screening process turns almost entirely on credentials,
which are an imperfect proxy for knowledge. The graduate student who
knows more about the effects of a particular virus than anybody might
not qualify as an expert witness on the topic, and therefore would proba-
bly never be called as a witness. The chairman of the graduate student's
department, on the other hand, will qualify easily, no matter what she
knows.
Gross, supra note 25, at 1160-61.
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When the underlying empirical data is incomplete or ques-
tionable assumptions supplement the data, an educational
background [or, I would add, instinctive talent] cannot fill the
gaps. Under those conditions when the connection between
the underlying empirical data and the expert's opinion is ten-
uous, the jury receives unreliable testimony. Judges should
exclude such testimony.' 9'
In a sense, such a rule would be conflict-based, though the
conflict would not be so much a financial one as one between the
legal and scientific cultures. It would be based on the intuition
that the techniques of a person who spends no time in actual
scientific practice, even when that person once did so, will inevi-
tably diverge from those accepted in science. Eventually, the
person's work techniques will move closer and closer to what is
effective in trial or deposition practice, and at some point it does
not make sense to treat that person as a scientific expert at
all.
192
One might be concerned that it would be difficult to find ex-
perts who are both qualified and disinterested, but that is un-
likely to be the case. Indeed, an approach like this seems to
have succeeded in the ongoing breast implant litigation. 9 3 The
recent court-appointed expert panel in the consolidated state
and federal breast implant cases in Oregon was composed of ex-
perts in four scientific areas, none of whom had previously done
research on the risks of silicone."9
It nevertheless might be the case that sometimes the only
available experts would be individuals who, from a scientific
perspective, were considered to have conflicts. 9 5 In such a case,
191. Murphy, supra note 190, at 651 (citation omitted).
192. Peter Huber argues that the process of expert selection almost inevitably re-
sults in expert testimony of poor quality. As he describes it, the system forces the
lawyers on each side to select experts that exaggerate the certainty of their position
and downplay any uncertainty. See HUBER, supra note 9, at 17-20 (1991). One of the
court-appointed experts in Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387 (D.
Or. 1996), made the same point. See id. at 1448.
193. See Hall, 947 F. Supp. at 1393.
194. See id.
195. See, e.g., MICHAEL D. GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS: THE CHALLENG-
ES OF MASS Toxic SUBSTANCES LITIGATION 196-97 (1996). Professor Green reports
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perhaps experts who otherwise would be disqualified because of
bias should be allowed to testify. As one court has noted:
In determining whether an expert is sufficiently knowl-
edgeable to be admitted to testify, one of the factors that the
district court ought to consider is whether other experts exist
who are more specifically qualified and who are nonetheless
not in the employ of the company or industry whose practices
are being challenged. If the only experts permitted to testify
inevitably represent the same side of a civil case, those who
possess these experts can, for all practical purposes, set their
own standards.19
The Court-Appointed Witness. Some courts hearing cases of
contentious scientific evidence have appointed their own experts.
This would seem to overcome the problem of bias, though it has
been suggested that no expert is truly unbiased, so that any bi-
ases of a court-appointed expert-who necessarily comes with
the imprimatur of the court-will perhaps be more insidious.197
that when the judge in the multidistrict Bendectin litigation proposed using court-
appointed experts, the plaintiffs "argue[d] that virtually all experts were tainted by
some connection to Merrell [Dow Pharmaceuticals, the defendant]." Id. at 196. Green
notes that [tihere was some basis to [the plaintiffs'] claim: Merrell had funded a
number of the researchers who had studied Bendectin and had contacted and hired
others to serve as expert witnesses on its behalf." Id. at 196-97. Green indicates
that the judge did not find the plaintiffs' claim credible, yet he did not appoint any
experts in the case. See id. at 197.
196. Stagl v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 117 F.3d 76, 81 (2d Cir. 1997); see also Berger,
supra note 21, at 56 (noting that '[wihen the experts in a field are all arrayed on
one side of the case . . . a court may have to allow some leeway" in admitting the
other side's expert testimony).
There also might be circumstances in which a litigant who already has a biased
expert could not afford to retain another, disinterested expert. In such circumstances,
the court might appoint its own expert. Cf Joe S. Cecil & Thomas E. Willging,
Accepting Daubert's Invitation: Defining a Role for Court-Appointed Experts in Assess-
ing Scientific Validity, 43 EMORY L.J. 995, 1052 (1994) (describing a court's appoint-
ment of an expert in a case in which an indigent family claimed damages as a re-
sult of exposure to toxic chemicals, but were limited by their finances in presenting
expert testimony, and "[tihe judge doubted the integrity of the defendants' expert
testimony").
197. See Cecil & Willging, supra note 196, at 1022 (discussing survey of federal
district court judges regarding their use of court-appointed experts, and noting that
"[sleveral judges doubted that such testimony would be truly neutral"); E. Donald
Elliott, Toward Incentive-Based Procedure: Three Approaches for Regulating Scientific
Evidence, 69 B.U. L. REV. 487, 509 (1989) ("Many people object to appointing a sin-
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At the very least, cross-examination of court-appointed experts
should be permitted; at present, sometimes it is not.198 Alterna-
tively, perhaps the law should impose an obligation on court-ap-
pointed experts to be even-handed in their testimony, as some
professional organizations require of their members; 99 or, as
Professor Elliott has recommended, the use of court-appointed
experts could be limited to narrowly defined circumstances in an
effort to lessen this problem." 0
With these protections, the relative independence of court-ap-
pointed experts at least has the potential of reducing concerns
about bias in the courtroom. This potential, however, is not al-
ways realized. Consider, for example, Hall v. Baxter Healthcare
gle expert to testify as a witness for the court because all experts have their own
views which, if presented with the court's implicit imprimatur, may be given undue
weight by a jury."); The Fifteenth Annual Judicial Conference of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 180 F.R.D. 467, 505 (1998) (quoting District
Judge Marvin J. Garbus's observation that a "genuine" fear exists that "if a court-
appointed expert appears before a jury, it is, for all practical purposes, outcome de-
terminative" and his conclusion that "that has to be avoided").
198. Indeed, courts sometimes intentionally avoid cross-examination of their experts.
This was the case in Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Or.
1996), a silicone-breast-implant case, in which the district court judge appointed "in-
dependent advisors," noting- "To keep the advisors independent of any ongoing pro-
ceedings, I appointed them under FRE 104, not FRE 706, which requires court-ap-
pointed experts, in effect, to act as additional witnesses subject to depositions and
testifying at trial. Although certain plaintiffs . . . moved to invoke Rule 706 proce-
dures . . . I denied those motions." Id. at 1392 n.8; cf. Cecil & Willging, supra note
196, at 1002-04 (stating that courts' "inherent power" to appoint technical advisors is
"virtually undisputed," but that such appointments should be rare).
199. The National Society of Professional Engineers, for example, states that "[e]ngi-
neers shall be objective and truthful in professional reports, statements or testimony.
They shall include all relevant and pertinent information in such reports, statements
or testimony. . . ." NATIONAL SOCY OF PROFVL ENG2RS, supra note 72, § II.3.a. Not
all organizations impose such an obligation, though. For example, the AMA says that
"[tihe attorney for the party who calls the physician as a witness should be in-
formed of all favorable and unfavorable information developed by the physician's
evaluation of the case," AMA, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 70, § 9.07, but
it does not require a similar disclosure to the court. In cases of bias, perhaps great-
er obligations should be imposed.
200. Elliott would attempt to ameliorate the problem of biased court-appointed ex-
perts by (1) using them only in cases in which "substantial doubt" exists as to the
scientific validity of the testimony offered by one of the parties, so that there is a
pre-existing risk of misleading the fact finder, and (2) having them testify not to
their own opinions, but to the views of the scientific community. See Elliott, supra
note 197, at 509-10.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:1313
Corp.,201 a silicone breast implant case. In Hall, Judge Robert
Jones appointed four "technical advisors" °2 whom he described
as "totally unbiased and uncommitted experts in the necessary
fields," which were epidemiology, immunology/toxicology, rheu-
matology, and chemistry. °s The epidemiology advisor, Dr.
Merwyn Greenlick, evaluated the proposed testimony of the epi-
demiology experts employed by both the plaintiffs and defen-
dants, and he observed that "both [the defendants' expert's] and
[the plaintiffs' expert's] opinions are based on scientifically valid
data" and that they had both used valid scientific methodolo-
gies.2°' Referring to a particular study of the effects of breast
implants, Dr. Greenlick said that "it is even possible for reason-
able epidemiologists to arrive at diametrically opposed conclu-
sions, as do [the defendants' and plaintiffs' experts], with regard
to the.., study."20
5
Judge Jones nevertheless excluded the testimony of the plain-
tiffs' expert, which primarily related to a rather ill-defined phe-
nomenon labeled atypical connective tissue disease (ACTD).216
Judge Jones rejected the testimony because he had decided to
reject all testimony regarding ACTD.207 He wrote that "[b]ecause
ACTD is at best an untested hypothesis, there is no scientific
basis for any expert testimony as to its causes and presence in
plaintiffs."2 °8 In adopting this view, Judge Jones apparently
accepted the defendants' argument that "the plaintiff's expert's
position is 'merely a hypothesis-not proven-not science.'"20 9
However, the judge's expert, Dr. Greenlick, specifically rejected
[the plaintiffs' expert's] argument: "That represents a serious
misunder-standing of what is intended by this statement. In
fact, [this] statement is at the heart of science."210
201. 947 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Or. 1996).
202. As discussed above, these "technical advisors" were not experts appointed un-
der Federal Rule of Evidence 706. See supra note 198.
203. Hall, 947 F. Supp. at 1393.
204. Id. at 1448.
205. Id. at 1450.
206. See id. at 1404 & nn.37-38.
207. See id. at 1402.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 1448 (quoting defendants' closing argument).
210. Id.
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Why, then, did the judge disregard the advice of his own
court-appointed expert? His decision seemed to rest, at least in
part, on a belief that when a scientific expert witness begins
theorizing with little information to back up his theories, the
expert is motivated by bias. The plaintiffs' witness in Hall, Dr.
David Goldsmith, was initially unwilling to testify that it was
more likely than not that silicone leaking from breast implants
could cause disease in women. 1' When the abstract of a new
study reporting a higher risk from silicone appeared,2" however,
Dr. Goldsmith was willing to testify that causation was more
likely than not.21 Judge Jones disallowed Dr. Goldsmith's testi-
mony, indicating his belief-contrary to the advice of his own
expert-that it would be unreliable.2 4 The judge, however, went
further, stating that he found Dr. Goldsmith's "change in so-
called 'scientific opinion' not only suspect, but shocking."2"5 This
suggests that the judge might have been influenced in his opin-
ion of the expert's testimony by what he evidently believed was
some sort of bias. Although Judge Jones's skepticism seems to
have been a result of the change in Dr. Goldsmith's opinion, that
seems odd: one would think that an expert who was initially
unwilling to provide testimony that would favor his client dem-
onstrated at least some freedom from bias.
Regardless of whether the party witness was biased, though,
one would think that when the judge's court-appointed witness
vouched for the scientific validity of his testimony, the issue of
bias would have been removed from the case. Providing objectiv-
ity is, after all, the reason the court appoints its own expert.
That is not to say that Judge Jones might not have had other
reasons to exclude the testimony of the plaintiffs' expert,216 but
211. See id. at 1405.
212. See id.
213. See id.
214. See id. at 1405-06.
215. Id. at 1405 n.39.
216. One unsatisfactory reason was offered by Judge Jones in his ruling that the
epidemiological studies about which the expert would have testified "cannot support
expert testimony that silicone 'more likely than not' causes disease or signs and
symptoms of disease in women." Id. at 1405. Judge Jones explained that none of the
studies showed a relative risk of greater than 2.0, which would be the risk neces-
sary to make the cause of disease more likely due to the silicone implants than to
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in light of his comments one is led to wonder whether his per-
ception of bias might have played a role that the testimony of
the court's expert should have eliminated. If a trial judge uses
court-appointed experts, and those experts accept the scientific
validity of the testimony of party witnesses, the judge should
admit the party witnesses' testimony, at least in the absence of
any showing that the court-appointed experts are themselves bi-
ased.2
17
2. Testimony About Research When the Researcher Is Not
Present
When a scientific expert witness testifies regarding the re-
search of others, elimination of the bias of the witness does not
some other, presumably pre-existing cause. See id. Exclusion on this basis, however,
was directly contrary to the report of the court's own expert. Dr. Greenlick wrote
that "[firom a scientific point of view it is not appropriate to disregard relative risks
of less than 2.0." Id. at 1450. He noted that the epidemiological studies about which
the expert would have testified did not test specifically for the conditions for which
the plaintiffs were claiming damages. See id. at 1451. The strongest of the studies
tested for various specific connective tissue diseases, rather than ACTD. See id. at
1404 nn.37-38. Dr. Greenlick therefore claimed that the proper approach was to use
the studies in association with other evidence, such as the evidence suggesting the
biological plausibility of a causal link. See id. He said that "the only way one can
ultimately assess the significance of the epidemiological data in this case is through
relatively complex integration of that information with the scientific testimony from
other fields," and that, depending on the nature of that other evidence, the epide-
miological studies might "provide evidence for the causal link to atypical disease at
a relative risk even greater than that for typical disease." Id. at 1451.
A more valid reason for excluding the testimony might have been that, as
Judge Richard Posner noted in another case, "the courtroom is not the place for
scientific guesswork, even of the inspired sort." Rosen v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 78 F.3d
316, 319 (7th Cir. 1996). Judge Posner seemed to concede in this statement that
certain testimony was scientific, even if guesswork. Posner's comments suggest an
avenue for excluding the testimony in Hall as unscientific, despite the contrary view
of the court-appointed scientific expert, who presumably knew better. That is, Judge
Jones might reasonably have excluded the testimony not because it was scientific
guesswork, but because he concluded that it was, as a legal matter, guesswork. In
taking this approach, though, he should acknowledge that he is making a legal deci-
sion, not a scientific one.
217. In Hall, as noted above, Judge Jones said that the court's experts were "total-
ly unbiased and uncommitted." Hall, 947 F. Supp. at 1393. The judge permitted no
cross-examination of his witnesses, so the parties were apparently unable to test
that statement. See supra note 198.
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exhaust the conflict of interest problems. As described above,
research may be subject to conflicts of interest that can distort
the design and reporting of research projects."' In this area,
where the conflicts affect the research itself, rather than its pre-
sentation in court, it seems reasonable to look to science's ap-
proach to handling conflicts. This approach, of course, is in ac-
cord with Daubert's direction that the courts look to scientific
standards. Moreover, it is quite feasible because both federal
regulators of science and scientific institutions have established
rules to address these conflicts.
At a minimum, scientific institutions require disclosure of po-
tential conflicts,2 9 and a similar requirement would be reason-
able in litigation. This means that when witnesses testify about
research done by others, courts should require them to disclose
any conflicts of the scientists who performed the research. Of
course, instances may exist in which witnesses will not have ac-
cess to information about the conflicts of those about whose re-
search they testify. In such cases, presumably the best a court
could do is require, as the FDA does in analogous circumstances,
that the litigant provide a certification that it has "acted with
due diligence to obtain the information but was unable to do so
and stating the reason."2
A more difficult question is how to handle conflicts that are
disclosed. As described above, science generally goes further
than the rough equivalent of cross-examination,2 1 which is the
usual approach in litigation. Cross-examination in this context is
not likely to be entirely effective because lay fact finders are
likely to find it difficult to assess the significance of conflicts in
research. It will be even more ineffective when the witness did
not conduct the research and therefore may not be able to re-
spond to questions about it. Scientists generally require at least
the disclosure of the data underlying the final research report in
218. See supra notes 115-74 and accompanying text.
219. See id.
220. Financial Disclosure by Clinical Investigators, 21 C.F.R. § 54.4(c) (1998); see
also supra text accompanying note 174.
221. See supra notes 107-10, 114, 169-71, and accompanying text.
1375
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:1313
these circumstances,222 and courts also could impose such a re-
quirement in litigation. This would give the opposing party a
better opportunity to expose any problems in the research. As
with information regarding the existence of conflicts, it might
not always be possible for litigants to obtain research data, but,
again, a requirement that the litigant show due diligence could
be substituted.223
Beyond the conflicts of researchers, and even more troubling,
are conflicts that affect the selection of research to be funded
and reported. 2' The issues here do not fit well within the frame-
work set out by Daubert because that framework focuses on how
to determine whether a particular item of proffered research is
scientific, and these sorts of conflicts alter the items that are in
fact proffered. Probably the most universally condemned of the
limitations on scientific research are those that restrict what re-
searchers may disclose about work that they have performed.
The effect of these limitations in skewing the scientific record is
obvious. An appropriate solution, it seems, would require liti-
gants to disclose all publication limitations that were imposed
on the research they present. This requirement should apply not
only to proffered testimony, but to all research funded by the
sponsors of proffered research, because only then could a court
determine whether some scientific evidence was being withheld
only because a sponsor had suppressed it.
In some cases, as with research performed in-house by a liti-
gant, explicit contracts governing what research may be pub-
lished are unlikely. In these cases, there would seem to be two
possible solutions. The solution most likely to produce full infor-
222. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
223. It is important to note that this approach should lessen the problems of court-
ordered disclosure of research data. For a discussion of such problems, see Sympo-
sium, supra note 36. Because the burden would be on the proponent of the evidence
to disclose the underlying data or to show diligence in attempting to do so, court-or-
dered disclosure would be necessary only when due diligence was insufficient to pro-
duce the data. Further, because disclosure would be necessary only in case of con-
flicts, see infra note 228, when a relationship between the proponent of the evidence
and the research sponsor is likely to exist, diligence would usually produce the data.
224. See supra text accompanying notes 115-54.
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mation would be to require that the sources of the in-house re-
search disclose all of the research that they perform. Courts
could implement this rule through discovery when the sources of
research are themselves parties to the litigation. For example, in
the case of In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Products Liability
Litigation,225 District Judge Sam C. Pointer, Jr. required the
parties quarterly to "provide each other... all unredacted docu-
ments concerning ongoing research."226 The judge specified that
the research to which his order was applicable included research
that the producing party (a) is conducting or has conducted
with its own employees, facilities, or consultants; (b) is direct-
ly funding or has directly funded in whole or in part but is
being performed or was performed through outside investiga-
tors; (c) is receiving or has received reports or data about
from any other party or non-party. 7
If a party to litigation were to offer research sponsored by oth-
ers-e.g., others in the same industry-some other approach
would be necessary, because discovery would not necessarily
reach non-parties. One might think that this is an area in which
the Daubert 11 distinction between research conducted indepen-
dent of litigation and that conducted in connection with litiga-
tion-though not the implications that Daubert II drew from the
distinction-might be valid. It seems plausible that when re-
search is conducted in connection with litigation, the sponsor of
that litigation is more likely than in other circumstances to seek
to suppress unfavorable results.2 8
As the discussion above shows, however, suppression of sci-
entific results occurs in circumstances both connected and un-
225. Master File No. 92-P-10000-S (N.D. Ala. filed Nov. 27, 1996). To access the
pleadings in this case, see Index of IBREIMLITI (visited Oct. 3, 1998)
<http/www.ijc.gov/BREIMLIT>.
226. Order 36 (Production and Exchange of Information Regarding Ongoing Stud-
ies), Breast Implant Litigation (No. 92-P-10000-S).
227. Id.
228. See Francis E. McGovern, Comment, Implementing a Taint Test to Address the
Problems Raised by Compelled Disclosure, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1996,
at 185, 190 (suggesting that "[i]f... preliminary discovery reveals that a party
either supported or influenced the research it seeks to introduce at trial, then mind-
ful deconstruction [i.e., pretrial discovery of research results] would be allowed").
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connected with litigation. Courts therefore should address the
suppression problem even when the sponsor of proffered re-
search is not a party to the litigation in which it is presented.
Requiring disclosure of all research results, as suggested above
for parties, however, might be thought too intrusive. Alterna-
tively, a court might require, when a party offers research fund-
ed by an entity that reasonably could be viewed as interested in
the results of that research, that the party also make a reason-
able attempt to obtain information from the funding entity re-
garding its publication policies.
B. When the Witness Is the Researcher
As one would expect, conflict of interest problems are more
difficult when an expert is both witness and researcher. Al-
though it might be possible to distinguish the two sources of po-
tential bias when the expert testifies to research that she did
prior to, and unconnected with, litigation, the two sources are
inextricably linked when she performs research specifically for
litigation. As a result, the claim made earlier-that the biases of
a witness generally are manageable for legal fact finders-is no
longer applicable in these circumstances. The bias of the witness
may be reflected not only in her testimony, but also in the de-
sign of her research, in which case it will be more difficult for a
layperson to understand.
This, of course, was exactly the concern of Daubert II. That
case, however, failed to draw distinctions that can be used to
determine the seriousness of the problems that a conflict of in-
terest presents. Most importantly, as described above, it failed to
recognize that "pure" research can present conflicts as serious as
those in litigation.229 Conversely, it also failed to realize that it
is possible to make distinctions among different instances of re-
search conducted in connection with litigation. Not all such re-
search presents the same problems.
As described above, it may be reasonable to exclude testimony
by witnesses who do no research in a purely scientific setting-
229. See supra text accompanying notes 33-34.
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that is, witnesses who are not truly scientific experts. 3 0 This
rule is as applicable when a party is presenting research per-
formed in connection with litigation as when the research was
unconnected with litigation. In general, there seems no reason
why a party could not hire one expert to perform research for it
and hire another, who is a practicing scientist, to testify regard-
ing that research. To be sure, a compelling reason might exist
for some litigants: it might be too expensive to hire two experts.
In that case, though, the litigant should at least be required to
make a showing that the additional expense is significant in
relation to the overall costs of the litigation.3 1
One might ask why, if the party can find a practicing scientist
to testify to the research, it could not find a practicing scientist
to perform it as well. The reason, however, has been acknowl-
edged by the courts. In considering the argument that "most of
the [expert's] work since 1976 has been for the plaintiffs in liti-
gation," the Third Circuit in a recent case noted that "[flor liti-
gants to have access to experts, it may be necessary for some
experts to concentrate on litigation."232 This seems a valid con-
cern, at least when the litigant's need is for an expert to perform
research, which can be very time-consuming.
One might also object that a litigant could find it as difficult
to hire a scientist to take the time to testify to research as it
would to hire one to perform that research. That seems unlikely,
though: testimony is generally less time-consuming than re-
search. Moreover, if legitimate scientists are unwilling to testify
to particular research, a court reasonably might be concerned
that their unwillingness is a result of the quality of the research
rather than of the time their testimony would consume. As a
result, although a court in certain circumstances might permit
an expert who is not a practicing scientist to present research,
230. See supra text accompanying notes 185-92.
231. When the litigant is pursuing the case on a contingency-fee basis, the required
showing should take into account the lawyer's position and the relationship of the
case to others that the lawyer is pursuing.
232. Brown v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth. (In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig.),
35 F.3d 717, 753-54 (3d Cir. 1994).
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the court also should require the litigant to disclose why its ef-
forts to hire practicing scientists to present the research were
unsuccessful.
The implications of these suggestions can be illustrated by
two examples. Consider first the testimony of Dr. Alan Done, a
prominent witness in the Bendectin litigation and in other toxic-
tort litigation. 33 Dr. Done was the plaintiffs primary witness in
Oxendine v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc."M The plaintiff
won at trial in Oxendine, the trial judge granted the defendant
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and the court of appeals
reversed, reinstating the trial verdict.3 5 Merrell Dow subse-
quently sought to reopen the case, alleging perjury by Dr. Done
in describing his academic position.36
The perjury proceedings are described in Professor Michael
Green's book on the Bendectin litigation, Bendectin and Birth
Defects: The Challenges of Mass Toxic Substances Litigation.37
As Professor Green describes it, the basis of the perjury claim
was that Dr. Done had testified, after he had resigned from his
position, that he was on the faculty of Wayne State Universi-
ty.2 38 Professor Green notes that this sort of issue generally
would be unlikely to lead to overturning a jury verdict, but the
trial judge did in fact overturn the judgment and order a new
trial.2 9 The judge found "'that [Dr. Done's] testimony [regarding
his position at Wayne State] was so deliberately false that all
his testimony on behalf of plaintiff is suspect.'"24' The court of
appeals reversed again.24'
233. See GREEN, supra note 195, at 277 (relating Done's experience in another
pharmaceutical case, Mekdeci, and "a number of drug cases").
234. 563 A.2d 330 (D.C. 1989).
235. See id. at 334-37. The trial judge also had granted a new trial as an alterna-
tive to the judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and that grant also was reversed
by the court of appeals. See id.
236. See GREEN, supra note 195, at 280.
237. See id. at 280-81.
238. See id.
239. See Oxendine, 563 A.2d at 331.
240. GREEN, supra note 195, at 281 (quoting Oxendine v. Merrell Dow Pharms.,
Inc., Civ. No. 1245-82 (D.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 11, 1988) (Memorandum Order)).
241. See id.
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Professor Green's interpretation of this sequence of events is
that the trial judge initially granted judgment notwithstanding
the verdict because he did not believe Dr. Done's testimony and
that, though the judge was reversed by the court of appeals, he
used the perjury claim as a second opportunity to reject Dr.
Done's testimony.242 That interpretation seems correct in light of
the judge's statement quoted above, but consider another possi-
bility. In the perjury litigation, the dean of Wayne State's medi-
cal school testified "that he had requested Done's resignation be-
cause he had been derelict in fulfilling his academic duties at
Wayne State and that he was devoting a 'large percentage' of his
time to testifying as an expert in lawsuits."2  The trial judge re-
ferred to this circumstance, noting that Dr. Done's "'professional
witness status led him to shirk his duties at the Wayne State
Medical School."' 4
A judge might reasonably have been concerned that, in light
of Dr. Done's shift from scientific to legal activities, he was no
longer qualified as a scientific expert witness. Dr. Done had im-
pressive academic qualifications, 5 but, as his dean testified, he
had moved away from his scientific activities to his legal ones. It
would not be unreasonable to think that he had also moved
away from scientific skepticism and rigor to a more credulous
adversary posture.24 In a sense, he would fit the analogy of a
lawyer who had once tried many cases but had left active trial
work to work as an actor in dramatic productions of trials. Inev-
itably, a transition like this will cause one to deviate from the
practices of one's original profession to those of one's new profes-
sion. Just as the lawyer might abandon those techniques that
work in real trials in favor of those that work in dramatic repre-
sentations of trials, Dr. Done might have abandoned scientific
techniques for those that work in the courtroom.
242. See id.
243. Id. at 280.
244. Id. at 281 (quoting Oxendine).
245. See id. at 278-79.
246. Lawyers who have engaged in litigation, and even those who have not, should
be able to sympathize. When making particular arguments day after day, it is diffi-
cult to retain one's objectivity regarding those arguments.
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The approach proposed here would require-because Dr. Done
was no longer a practicing scientist-that his epidemiological
analyses be presented by some other, practicing scientist. Thus,
without excluding his7 testimony entirely, it would supply an ad-
ditional check on it through requiring the plaintiff to find a
practicing scientist who would vouch for it.24 The plaintiff, Mary
Oxendine, could avoid this requirement only by showing either
(1) that requiring her (or her lawyer) to hire an additional ex-
pert would be too financially burdensome, or (2) that she was
unable to find a practicing scientist to present the evidence, in
which case she would also have to explain why she was unable
to do so.
In contrast, when the plaintiff offers the testimony of a prac-
ticing scientist about research that scientist has performed,
there should be less concern about bias. Such a scientist is less
likely to adopt unscientific methods, both because he uses scien-
tific methods in his non-legal scientific work and because he has
a scientific-not just a legal-reputation to protect. That is not
to say that such a scientist would never skew the design of his
research; he still should be required to disclose the underlying
data from which his testimony derives. But the danger of bias
should be less than in the case of the "professional witness."
These distinctions are not always recognized. For example, in
Braun v. Lorillard, Inc., 48 the plaintiff offered the testimony of
Dr. David Schwartz, an expert who had tested Braun's lung tis-
sue for asbestos, which he found. Dr. Schwartz was a professor
of biochemistry and was experienced in testing building materi-
als for asbestos using a technique called high-temperature
ashing.4 9 He used the same technique to test Braun's tissue,
though different techniques were standard for testing body tis-
sue for asbestos.2" The Seventh Circuit affirmed the decision of
the trial court to exclude his testimony.
247. This approach is similar to one proposed by Judge Posner in Braun u.
Lorillard Inc., 84 F.3d 230 (7th Cir. 1996), which is discussed below. See infra text
accompanying notes 251-54.
248. 84 F.3d 230 (7th Cir. 1996).
249. See id. at 233-34.
250. See id.
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The court's reason for excluding the testimony was purported-
ly that the testimony was not scientific. It pointed out that Dr.
Schwartz did not investigate whether his technique could validly
be extended from the testing of building materials to the testing
of body tissue and said that "[t]he scientific witness who decides
to depart from the canonical methods must have grounds for
doing so that are consistent with the methods and usages of his
scientific community."2"' It is difficult to know, though, in what
way Dr. Schwartz's methods were unscientific. The extension of
a test from one domain to another is certainly something done in
science. 2 It is true that Dr. Schwartz did not test his procedure,
and it might have been reasonable to exclude his testimony on
that ground,2"3 but the lack of testing was not the focus of the
opinion in Braun. In fact, the court wrote that "[t]he plaintiffs'
lawyers could have called one of the recognized experts in the
testing of human tissues to validate Dr. Schwartz's novel meth-
odology-the ones they had hired, for example-but they did
not,"2" which suggests that the objection was to Dr. Schwartz,
not to his testimony.
At another point, the court indicated that it was not Dr.
Schwartz himself, but his expertise, that was the problem: "An
expert in the detection of asbestos in building materials cannot
be assumed to be an expert in the detection of asbestos in hu-
man tissues."255 This reasoning, and the willingness of the court
to turn to the tissue-testing experts, is questionable. It is not
clear why the relevant area of expertise was that of testing hu-
man tissue rather than that of using high-temperature ashing,
the technique used by Dr. Schwartz. One might well replace the
Seventh Circuit's statement that "[an expert in the detection of
asbestos in building materials cannot be assumed to be an ex-
pert in the detection of asbestos in human tissues"256 with the
251. Id. at 234.
252. Testing biological materials for asbestos using the same method that is used
to test building materials might be a valid technique, but it might not. More testing
would be required to know, but at no point during the testing process would the
theory suddenly become "scientific."
253. See infra notes 261-65 and accompanying text.
254. Braun, 84 F.3d at 235.
255. Id.
256. Id.
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statement that "an expert in the use of bleach digestion and low-
temperature plasma ashing cannot be assumed to be an expert
in the use of high-temperature ashing,"257 and thus could not
validate Dr. Schwartz's testimony.25
The court's real concern is perhaps suggested by the state-
ments that followed the above quotation:
The fact that the plaintiffs' lawyer turned to this nonexpert,
having already consulted experts without obtaining any use-
ful evidence, is suggestive of the abuse, or one of the abuses,
at which Daubert and its sequelae are aimed. That abuse is
the hiring of reputable scientists, impressively credentialed,
to testify for a fee to propositions that they have not arrived
at through the methods that they use when they are doing
their regular professional work rather than being paid to give
an opinion helpful to one side in a lawsuitY9
The concern here is not with Dr. Schwartz's scientific validity,
but with his objectivity, a concern also reflected elsewhere in the
opinion.26
There are several problems with this focus. First, it is not at
all clear that Dr. Schwartz really did have a conflict. He appears
to have had a successful business testing building materials. It
is possible, of course that he was anticipating a new sideline in
testing human tissue, but if the mere possibility of future em-
ployment as a witness were enough to infer bias, every expert
257. Bleach digestion and low-temperature plasma ashing are the techniques gener-
ally used in tissue testing. See id. at 233-34.
258. As an analogy, imagine the early use of DNA matching, when the process had
been established but had not been applied to the identification of human beings.
Imagine, further, that an expert in DNA matching offered to give testimony using
the technique to identify a criminal defendant. Such identification might never have
been attempted before, and therefore might have been questionable testimony if its
accuracy were not tested. To that extent, the Seventh Circuit is correct. If the testi-
mony were questionable, however, it could not be "validated" by experts who used
other kinds of identification techniques, like fingerprinting, the analogy to the court's
suggestion that experts in human tissue testing could have validated Dr. Schwartz's
testimony. On the contrary, one would expect the experts in DNA matching to be
the ones most likely able to assess its performance in identification.
259. Braun, 84 F.3d at 235.
260. See id. (stating that a witness who departs from the usual testing methods
must "ground his departure in demonstrable and scrupulous adherence to the
scientist's creed of meticulous and objective inquiry").
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would be biased. In any event, the court did not discuss any evi-
dence suggesting that he was expecting such future employment.
Unlike Dr. Done, Dr. Schwartz appears to have been a
practicing scientist, and when such a scientist is offered as a
witness, a court should not assume bias without some specific
evidence.
Perhaps the court, despite its reference to the fact that Dr.
Schwartz was "testify[ing] for a fee,"261 was not so much con-
cerned with his bias as a witness as with his bias as a re-
searcher. The court did observe that Dr. Schwartz's work was
insufficiently "meticulous.2 62 This might have been a reasonable
concern, and entirely in accord with Daubert, if the problem was
that insufficient support for the research's scientific validity had
been introduced. The court's concern, however, was apparently
not the amount of support for the validity of the research but
the source of that support. As noted above, the court would have
accepted validation of the work by the plaintiff's other experts; it
just would not accept it from Dr. Schwartz.2  In the end, the
court's reasoning appears to have been circular: the court's own
perception of the insufficient meticulousness of Dr. Schwartz's
research, combined with the fact-referred to by the court in the
same sentence-that Dr. Schwartz was being paid, led to an in-
ference that Dr. Schwartz was biased, which led back to a refus-
al to accept his validation of the quality of the research.2 6
The approach of the Braun court in requiring validation of Dr.
Schwartz's work by other scientists may seem similar to the pro-
261. Braun, 84 F.3d at 235.
262. See id.
263. See supra text accompanying note 254.
264. The willingness of a scientist to express opinions on the basis of inconclusive
data is not necessarily evidence that the scientist is merely responding to the legal
exigencies faced by her client. For example, one of the court-appointed experts in
Hall noted of a controversial issue that "work in the area has progressed to the
point that [the plaintiffs' expert's] confidence in the notion of an association has
moved far enough away from zero that he and others have begun to make a serious
investment in studying the problem." Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp.
1387, 1449 (D. Or. 1995). The fact that scientists are making such an "investment"
in their own work makes it scientific. Courts still could exclude evidence of such a
nature as too uncertain, but they should do so on a legal basis, not a putatively sci-
entific one.
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posal above that Dr. Done's work be presented by practicing sci-
entists. The difference, though, is that the justification for re-
quiring another scientist to validate Dr. Done's work was that
Dr. Done was not himself a practicing scientist. For Dr.
Schwartz, that justification apparently did not apply, and indeed
it was not applied by the court. The key point here is separating
the biases of witnesses from those of researchers. Courts can
appropriately handle the bias of a witness by excluding the wit-
ness, but because witness bias is readily appreciated by legal
fact finders, exclusion is appropriate only in extreme cases.
The bias of a researcher is not appropriately handled by ex-
cluding the research. Instead, a court should require the re-
searcher to disclose his conflict of interest and the data underly-
ing his research results. The court then should determine, under
Daubert, whether the research is scientifically valid. This ap-
proach will determine whether the bias had any concrete effects.
In contrast, the trial (or appellate) judge's vague sense that the
researcher was biased has no place here, because in yielding to
that sense the judge would be assessing the researcher's credi-
bility-a task that the jury can perform equally well." 5 If the
Seventh Circuit in Braun let a perception that Dr. Schwartz was
biased affect its assessment of the validity of his research, it
usurped the role of the jury.
C. Peer Review, General Acceptance, and Conflicts of Interest
As the previous sections have argued, courts should keep sep-
arate the issues of witness bias and the scientific validity of re-
search, taking researcher bias into account only to determine the
level of scrutiny to be applied to research. Even when courts
honor this separation, though, the inquiry into scientific validity
can be affected by conflicts of interest. The two most significant
of the Supreme Court's admissibility criteria in Daubert, peer
review and general acceptance in the scientific community, can
themselves be tainted by conflicts.
265. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 77-78 (describing the AMA's similarly sub-
stantive approach).
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1. Peer Review 266
To the extent that one can read the Supreme Court's com-
ments in Daubert to support either a view that scientific peer
review is a standard that is too strict for legal admissibility or
too lenient, the court viewed peer review as too strict.267 The
Court observed that "s]ome propositions... are too particular,
too new, or of too limited interest to be published."268 Moreover,
this is the view shared by at least some commentators, who
have argued that peer review tends to suppress new scientific
ideas. 9 One reason for this is that because peer reviewers are
generally researchers established in the field, they have an in-
terest in the current structure of research in the area.270 In other
words, they have conflicts of interest. If this is correct, requiring
that testimony be peer-reviewed might exclude new scientific
theories that could offer plausible, yet untested, theories con-
cerning the cause of a particular harm.
On the other hand, some commentators believe that peer re-
view is too lenient a standard for legal purposes:
Even if [peer] reviewers had the time and inclination to
check every paper very critically, and in exhaustive detal,
there are good reasons why they should not. Scientists try to
advance knowledge, to raise new and interesting ideas, and
to suggest new possibilities-goals that would not be fur-
thered by excessively skeptical peer review. The rigorous
quality-control mechanisms that govern some scientific re-
search (such as Good Laboratory Practices) were imposed on
266. "Peer review" means here, as it presumably did in Daubert, see Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-94 (1993), the review by scientists of
articles submitted for publication in scientific journals. Commentators also have used
the term to refer to the larger process of the review of scientific findings by other
scientists. See, e.g., Effie J. Chan, Note, The 'Brave New World" of Daubert: True
Peer Review, Editorial Peer Review, and Scientific Validity, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 100,
100 & n.1 (1995). For a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of peer review,
see DARYL E. CHUBIN & EDWARD J. HAcKETr, PEFRLSS ScIENcE: PEER REViEW AND
U.S. SCIENCE POLICY (1990).
267. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.
268. Id.
269. See David F. Horrobin, The Philosophical Basis of Peer Review and the Sup-
pression of Innovation, 263 JAMA 1438, 1438 (1990).
270. See id. at 1441.
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science by outside forces (the regulatory system, in the case
of GLP). Such standards are unpopular among scientists, be-
cause they greatly increase the cost and difficulty of doing re-
search. Unlike regulators, editors often accept a paper de-
scribing an obviously preliminary or even obviously flawed
study if the work promises to be important or usefully pro-
vocative and controversial. Thus, the goals of science make it
undesirable to strive for too high a level of reliability in pub-
lished papers, and encourage a little creative noise in the sys-
tem.
271
This again suggests a conflict between the goals of law and sci-
ence. In this case, it suggests that peer review might not be suf-
ficient to ensure reliability of scientific evidence, a conclusion
which puts in doubt the reliance of decisions like Daubert II on
peer review.
This is not the place, however, to discuss the more general
failings of a peer review screen. 27' For present purposes, it is im-
portant only to note the common features of the two criticisms:
they both involve circumstances in which the scientific topic of
interest is new or controversial. These are exactly the circum-
stances, of course, in which scientific issues come before courts.
This suggests that even if peer review works well in the majori-
ty of cases in science, it may not do so in court. Sheila Jasanoff
has pointed out that scientists do not hesitate to use peer-re-
viewed journals to advance views that will provide them with
legal advantages,273 and that, indeed, peer review standards
271. FOSTER & HUBER, supra note 4, at 180.
272. Some of the more general failings of the process, however, may affect tort liti-
gation. "In recent years, many medical leaders have expressed concern that the re-
luctance of scientists and journal editors to publish studies that did not show any
benefits from a drug or therapy significantly skews the information available to doc-
tors and the public." Altman, supra note 128, at C1. The problem here is not neces-
sarily that actual dangers from drugs will not be reported; in the absence of control
by a commercial sponsor of a study, a journal would be likely to publish a study re-
porting dangers. To the extent that juries weigh costs and benefits, however, evi-
dence that suggests more benefit than might in fact exist also will distort the jury's
deliberations. See id. ("[A] top Food and Drug Administration official said that the
end result is that scientific journals present a much more positive picture of new
drugs than the information the agency receives.").
273. See JASANOFF, supra note 136, at 51-52, 55-57.
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themselves may differ when the subject of the review is a matter
of legal contention.2"
At the very least, a court should know more about how the
peer review process works in cases of controversy before it ac-
cepts it as a criterion for evidentiary admissibility. Three recent
incidents, detailed below, illustrate the sorts of problems that
can arise. 5 None of these incidents show clear bias in the basic
journal peer review process." 6 Each does, however, provide an
example of a peer evaluation being used as a tool to promote a
particular point of view, rather than to provide an objective as-
sessment of research quality. Because the sorts of peer evalua-
tion involved in these incidents are among those accepted by
courts as "peer review," the incidents suggest the potential for
distortion by conflicts of interest of the review process.
The first incident involved the thyroid research of Dr. Betty
Dong.277 In addition to exercising its contractual rights to pre-
vent publication of Dr. Dong's research, Boots Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., later bought by Knoll Pharmaceutical Co., sought to dis-
credit the research by other means. A scientist employed by
Knoll wrote to the Journal of the American Medical Association
(JAMA), which had accepted Dr. Dong's article for publication,
criticizing her study and stating that the journal "should 'be con-
274. See id. at 51; see also SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVis-
ERS AS POLICYMNAKERS 68 (1990) ("Although its primary purpose is to provide quality
assurance, peer review is also used more or less consciously by both editors and
granting agencies to further social objectives, from upholding a funding program's
legislative mission to providing support for litigation.").
275. Another example arose in Peter Duesberg's advocacy of the view that the HIV
virus is not the cause of AIDS. See EPSTEIN, supra note 83, at 127-29. Duesberg
sought to publish an article on his views in the Proceedings of the National Acade-
my of Sciences (PNAS), in which, as a member of the academy, he generally was
entitled to publish without submitting his work to peer review. Because his work
was controversial, though, the editor of PNAS sent his work out to three reviewers.
See id. at 128. All three objected to the article, but PNAS published it nevertheless,
with the editor apparently washing his hands of what he still considered an unscien-
tific article. See id.
276. An incident in which journal peer review was distorted by the existence of a
legal controversy, however, is described by Sheila Jasanoff. See JASANOFF, supra note
274, at 68.
277. See supra notes 118-24 and accompanying text.
278. See Altman, supra note 118, at A16 (referring to the "energetic campaign7
waged by Knoll to discredit Dr. Dong).
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cerned about publishing the paper."'2 9 The same scientist then
published the company's own interpretation of Dr. Dong's work
in the American Journal of Therapeutics, reaching the opposite
result.2 80 The company thus sought both to circumvent the nor-
mal peer review process of JAMA and to use another peer-re-
viewed journal to discredit Dr. Dong's work.
A second instance arose from the recent issuance by the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency of new standards for airborne par-
ticulate matter. Industry representatives have severely criticized
these standards as based on inadequate science, and a think
tank called the Annapolis Center organized an effort to assess
the science supporting the standards."' Several scientists no-
ticed, however, that some of the scientists invited to participate
in the assessment were associated with industry, and it was dis-
covered that the Annapolis Center received eighty percent of its
funding from the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM)
and that its president was a vice president of NAM.282 Because
NAM's members generally are opposed to strict environmental
regulation,8 3 this suggests that the assessment was a matter of
advocacy, not objective evaluation.
In a final example, a scientist who conducted a reanalysis of a
form of spine surgery and found little evidence of benefit from
the surgery was attacked by a spine surgeon society and by a
patient advocacy group formed by a spine surgeon." The critics
said that "they were simply applying the standards of science to
the research findings,"2 85 but the scientist argued that the criti-
cism was harassment intended to protect the financial interests
of the society's surgeons in the questioned procedure.2 8 The pro-
cess of reanalysis that was at issue in this incident is often used,
and criticized, in litigation, so this incident suggests that criti-
279. Id. (quoting letter).
280. See id.
281. See John J. Fialka, Panel Judging EPA's Proposed Air Regulations Receives
Most of Its Funding From the Regulated, WALL ST. J., Jan. 16, 1997, at A20.
282. See id.
283. See id.
284. See Deyo et al., supra note 138, at 1176; Kolata, supra note 135, at D23.
285. Kolata, supra note 135, at D23.
286. See Deyo et al., supra note 138, at 1176.
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cism that purports to be based on scientific grounds may be
motivated by other concerns.
In the end, these incidents suggest that when contentious
matters are at issue-as they always are in litigation-courts
should approach peer review carefully. Whenever litigants at-
tempt to bolster scientific evidence by showing that it has been
peer-reviewed, or to discredit evidence by showing that peers
believe it is inadequate, courts should investigate the circum-
stances of the peer review. If an interested party funds the re-
view, as in the EPA particulate matter and spine surgery exam-
ples above,287 courts should approach it skeptically; moreover,
the proponent of a peer review should be required to disclose the
source of its funding. If, as in the Knoll example above,288 an
objective body conducted the review, but the reviewed research
appears intended to counter other scientific results, the court
might look past the satisfactory peer review of the proffered re-
search and assess the quality of the review. If other reviewers
rejected the research before its acceptance, or if it was accepted
only at a second- or third-tier journal, the court might give the
review little weight in determining admissibility.
2. General Acceptance
Daubert also retained the Frye requirement of general accep-
tance in the scientific community as a factor to be considered in
determining the admissibility of scientific evidence. The Court
wrote in Daubert that "'a known technique which has been able
to attract only minimal support within the community,' may
properly be viewed with skepticism."2 89 The implications of this
statement are somewhat unclear; particularly unclear are the
means that are acceptable for determining which techniques
have attracted support in the scientific community. One ap-
proach that the courts have taken, however, is to look to the
statements of professional medical and scientific organiza-
tions.290
287. See supra text accompanying notes 281-86.
288. See supra text accompanying notes 277-80.
289. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993) (quoting Unit-
ed States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238 (3d Cir. 1985)).
290. See FOSTER & HUBER, supra note 4, at 244-45. Foster and Huber advocate
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Sheila Jasanoff notes that various medical societies have is-
sued statements criticizing clinical ecology's claim to scientific
status. 91 She points out that at least one of these societies, the
California Medical Association, engaged in an extensive inquiry
before reaching its conclusions, and that at least one court has
relied upon the statements of the societies. 92 She nevertheless
says that "the court made no attempt to look behind the consen-
sus generated by [the societies] to question whether these orga-
nizations possessed any hidden biases or whether their consen-
sus-building efforts afforded sufficient protection against bias."
293
Given organized medicine's history of opposing "fringe"
groups,294 a history that other courts have found unjustified by
objective data,295 this failure by the court seems unwise. In a
number of antitrust cases, physicians and others have chal-
lenged the rules of medical societies as intended to advance
their members' financial interests and not science. 296 For exam-
ple, until 1980, the American Medical Association (AMA) called
chiropractic treatment "unscientific."297 Putting aside the truth
vel non of this claim, courts found that in opposing chiropractors
the AMA was motivated in part by the goal of eliminating com-
reliance on these reports:
Such reports often include minority statements or other indications of the
range of informed opinion. Any individual witness who holds views sharp-
ly at variance with statements like these should bear a heavy burden of
explaining why the individual is right and the community, speaking
through its committees, academies, or institutes, is wrong.
Id.
291. See JASANOFF, supra note 136, at 133-34. One such statement was issued by
the American Academy of Allergy, Asthma & Immunology. See American Academy of
Allergy, Asthma & Immunology, Position Statement #14: Clinical Ecology (visited
Oct. 6, 1998) <http://www.aadmc.org/currentliterature/position/psl4.html>. That state-
ment described clinical ecology as "an approach to medicine that ascribes a wide
range of symptoms in the environment." Id. (footnote omitted).
292. See id. (citing Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1208 (6th Cir.
1988)).
293. Id. at 134.
294. See, e.g., JASANOFF, supra note 274, at 61-62; Mark R. Patterson, Antitrust
Liability for Collective Speech: Medical Society Practice Standards, 27 IND. L. REV.
51, 63-65 (1993).
295. See Patterson, supra note 294, at 70.
296. See, e.g., id. at 53, 58-59, 63-70.
297. See Wilk v. American Med. Ass'n, 719 F.2d 207, 232 (7th Cir. 1983).
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petition, and that the AMA was unable to show that its purport-
ed concern for the scientific validity of chiropractic treatment
was "objectively reasonable."2 98 Other cases have demonstrated
similar absences of objectivity. 99
An example of how "general acceptance" can be manipulated
arose from the spine surgery research previously discussed. °0
The federal Agency for Health Care Policy and Research funded
that research.30 ' When data suggesting that the surgery provid-
ed little benefit appeared, spine surgeons wrote letters to Con-
gress seeking to abolish the agency; subsequently the agency's
budget was cut, and it discontinued the sort of work on treat-
ment guidelines that had produced the spine surgery study.0 2
This incident suggests that entities intended to provide consen-
sus views to which courts might look to assess "general accep-
tance" can be subject to influence from financial interests. Pre-
sumably, the influence could come from either side of a litigation
issue, but in many cases it may be that only the defendants will
have the money and organization sufficient to exercise this sort
of influence successfully.
With respect to these organizational evaluations of scientific
issues, then, the problem is that interested parties may influ-
ence science itself, or at least the most scientific expert bodies.
This problem, or potential problem, counsels caution in relying
on general acceptance in the relevant scientific community. As
with peer review, and as Sheila Jasanoff recommends, courts
should look behind expressions of scientific opinion to determine
whether they are truly expressions of objective scientific consen-
sus.
303
298. Id. at 362-63.
299. See generally Patterson, supra note 294 (discussing a number of cases in
which motives other than science influenced the disparagement of certain medical
practices or procedures).
300. See supra text accompanying notes 284-86.
301. See Kolata, supra note 135, at D23.
302. See id.
303. See JASANOFF, supra note 274, at 54-55.
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CONCLUSION
Conflicts of interest have significant implications for the reli-
ability of scientific expert testimony. However, the courts' treat-
ment of conflicts is not always in accord either with the treat-
ment of conflicts in scientific practice or with the particular
problems that scientists' conflicts present in court. In response,
this Article proposes two basic changes in the treatment of sci-
entific expert testimony. First, courts should strive to separate
issues of bias from issues of scientific validity-the two sets of
issues are now conflated at times. Second, courts should pay
more attention to biases of scientists who perform the research
underlying expert testimony, whereas now the focus is almost
exclusively on the biases of the witnesses who testify.
More generally, this Article casts doubt on the wisdom of
Daubert's deference to scientific standards for determining evi-
dentiary admissibility. The scientific questions that come before
courts are generally both contentious and uncertain. When such
questions are at issue, conflicts of interests often alter not only
normal scientific research practices, but also the two most fre-
quently used criteria of scientific validity relied upon by
Daubert: peer review and general acceptance in the scientific
community. Although the Daubert criteria may be valid in most
scientific contexts, they are likely to function least well for ex-
actly those scientific issues that come before the courts.
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